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Foreword 
 
I conducted this research study in the framework of Policy Research Fellowships Program of 
Open Society Forum in order to study how the ODA Mongolia received from donor countries 
and international organizations in recent years contributed general economic development, 
particularly rural development of our country and drawing policy recommendations on further 
aid policies.  
 
I performed the research by meeting relevant people of the government ministries and 
agencies, donor organizations and projects implementation units in Mongolia and in the form 
of local field visits in rural areas, during spring and summer months of 2004. 
 
Here I should mention that the research was conducted by a single researcher, therefore it was 
impossible to cover all levels of rural society down to the level of a herdsmen family, so I 
limited the coverage to aimag centers, which had the highest level or 45 percent of poverty by 
recent statistics (of 1998) and were focal points to deliver rural development.      
 
On the basis of the research result, I suggested priority fields in rural areas, particularly in 
aimag centers, where should ODA be concentrated at first order.  Also possible measures to 
be taken in the framework of ODA policy, implementation, monitoring and coordination were 
recommended not only for ODA in rural areas but also for ODA in general. 
 
This policy research was conducted during election 2004, which was a fairly difficult time for 
catching and reflecting reality. With a newly established government having the opportunity 
to set ODA policies, we hope that our proposed recommendations will make a positive 
contribution to the new government's policy making.     
 
Here we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the staff members of the Open Society 
Forum, who felt the sense of above necessities, initiated, sponsored and provided all kinds of 
supports to this research; regional coordinators of the Soros Foundation, who actively 
participated and assisted in the research; Mr. David Dyer who gave invaluable advice and 
instructed the process from the beginning; and advisor Mr. Sh.Gungaadorj, who edited the 
research report. 
 
Finally, I am grateful to government officers, business people and local people in aimags for 
their attachment of significance to the research, sincere attitude and kind provision of all 
possible information. 
 
S. Bat-Oyun 
Economist 
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ONE. BRIEF SUMMARY 
 
The ODA of 2.5 billion USD, Mongolia received since 1991, has greatly contributed the 
country in overcoming early periods of transition to a market economy with less trouble and 
laying the foundation of market economy. However, highly efficient use of the above amount 
of ODA would have resulted in GDP per capita 3-10 times higher than current level, poverty 
reduction to 10 % and infant mortality reduction to 7 per 1000 live birth, which is 3-4 times 
lower than their current level. Also it was estimated that the domestic investment would have 
reached the level- 9 times higher than the current level. It is related to the fact that Mongolia 
has poor economic policy and institutional structure and mechanism as well as poor 
implementation of laws and rules.      
 
Research shows that the ODA effectiveness is disappointing, especially in rural areas. It was 
explained by reasons of basically no development policy management, planning and priority 
setting, inadequate policy making and coordination; low salary level of civil servants, 
consequently leading to ethical distortion and corruption; and lack of a permanent system of 
monitoring and information. Also many factors, like over-politicization of ministries, 
implementing agencies and local government bodies; instability of human resource policies; 
and social-oriented, but not growth-oriented working approaches had negative effects on the 
ODA effectiveness. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the ODA effectiveness shall be 
increased by adopting sound economic policies, long and medium-term strategic planning, 
setting a list of ODA priorities, preferring economic efficiency as a basic indicator of project 
evaluation, organizing broad discussions on utilizing projects with economic efficiency rather 
than social ones, and creating public information system that provides systematic information 
on incoming foreign aid. And research results show that ODA can be economically more 
efficient if we use it further concentrating on a few directions such as private sector 
development, energy sector, small and medium enterprises  that process  livestock-origin and 
natural raw materials and housing projects at aimag centers.      
 
Moreover, there is a necessity to create a monitoring system that controls each stage of ODA 
policies and directions, project selection, qualification, implementation and follow-up stages. 
It is not an idea to create a completely new organization. Rather, we need to create a system 
where citizens, civil society and research institutions play a major role, while adding another 
condition to disclose information  in designing its working mechanism. Also, it is important to 
maintain a direction to increase the portion of grant aid in ODA up to 65-70% while reducing 
portion of loans down to 35-30%, as a common standard  of other developing countries. 
 
 
TWO.  BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Our country has received 2.5 billion USD of ODA between 1991-2002.  
 
The ODA Mongolia received between 1991-2002 has greatly contributed to the country's 
effort to overcome the socioeconomic transition and crisis situation of early 1990s. Mongolia 
made its transition with less trouble than it might have had, and laid a sound foundation for a 
market economy. For instance, a shortage of consumer products, including food and power 
supply, and severe balance of payment problems caused by the breakdown of former system 
were covered by the ODA, which created an opportunity to pass through this period of 
widespread socioeconomic problems in a relatively short period of time.  In addition, ODA 
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greatly contributed in laying basic foundations and implementing transition to a market 
economy properly.   
 
In early years ODA took a form of emergency aid, and then later (from 1994 when the crisis 
situation gave signs of ending and the economy started to grow)  it was used for physical 
infrastructure (energy, road and transportation and financial sectors) with to the intent of  
stabilizing the economy and laying foundations of market economy. Thanks to continuous 
efforts of Mongolian Government and with the needed infusion of ODA, the economy 
gradually grew, inflation was reduced from a triple digit rate to a single digit rate and private 
sector-based economic foundation was laid  down. For the last three years of transition, the 
government prioritised development of market system, poverty reduction, capacity building  
and strenthening of the public services. 
 
Although the government disbursed ODA equals to 2.5 times the country's GDP in the last 
decade, today the country still experiences a slow economic growth, high poverty level,  and 
continious migration from rural to urban areas.   This lack of progress raises questions: where 
is the outcome of such a large amount of loans and grant aid? And, to what extent has it been 
effective? Were the funds used efficiently on proper items? Or, given the lack of progress, 
isn't it time to change policies and regulations that have been maintained up to now?  Today 
we just see a GDP growth, but poverty level has not been reduced below the 1995 level,  
while 35-361 percent of total urban population is poor2 and another significant portion of 
population is close to the poverty line.  Also, a high level of unemployment, low quality of 
health and education services, unfavorable business environment, remoteness, inadequacy of 
financial sources and human resources- all cause a massive migration of rural citizens to 
urban areas in search of a better life. But this massive migration would not be considered as a 
problem if the immigrants could  find employment and better living conditions in urban areas.   
Migration patterns suggest forward another question: Could they have benefited more and 
achieved better results if policies and regulations were different from what we have now? 
Even though the Government of Mongolia started to adopt and implement a Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Growth Strategy in cooperation with the World Bank in order to 
solve the recent issues of  these socioeconomic problems, another question was raised on 
Mongolia's ability to create development pathways without the debt burden (of ODA loans) 
increasing year by year. These and other questions show that there is a necessity to study the 
issue and make necessary changes. 
 
Therefore, the objective of this research is to help policy makers to accept the above 
necessities and change their policies and regulation for receiving and utilizing ODA.  
    
 
2.2 Research 
 
2.2.1 Research purpose 
 
The main purpose of this research is to study how the ODA that Mongolia received from 
donor countries and international organizations in recent years contributed to its general 
economic development, and particularly development in rural areas of the country.  We also 
                      
1 Human Development Report of Mongolia 2003 
2
Average monthly consumption  up to 15180 MNT     - very poor 
   15180-25300 MNT     - poor 
   23501-40480 MNT       - non poor or average income 
     higher          - rich  as classified in the human development report "Urban and rural disparities" 
written in the framework of "Poverty research and employment facilitation" project implemented by UNDP.  
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derive policy recommendations on Mongolia might better receive and use the ODA further, 
on the basis of the research findings.  
 
In order to achieve the main objective , we tried to implement a set of activities in following 
phases:   
•  Studying system of ODA receiving policies and regulations of our country; 
•  Determining accuracy of ODA information;  
•  Identifying how accessible is ODA in rural areas and how it contributed to the 
rural development in rural areas; 
•  Drawing policy recommendation on how to improve policies and regulations 
on receiving ODA on the basis of advantages and disadvantages identified from 
the above framework;  
  
 
2.2.2 Terminological concepts of the research 
 
À) Since the research was conducted under title "Effectiveness of ODA on rural 
development", I aimed to focus it on rural areas. But the research concept "RURAL" refers to 
only aimag centers (in some cases soum centers with more than 15 thousands of population) 
and includes nomadic herdsmen that live on nomadic livestock breeding only if they were 
closely connected to the urban centers. In other words, it refers to aimag centers except for 
Ulaanbaatar. Here I should mention several reasons for this selection: 
 
- According to the "Human Development Report of Mongolia 2003", 
poverty level is relatively higher (39.4%) in urban areas than in rural 
areas.  The poverty level in aimag centers reached 45.13 percent of total 
population by 1998; 
 
- On the other hand, by developing aimag centers, living standards of 
total population residing in the aimag territory shall be improved. They 
will be able to meet their basic needs from aimag centers or the nearest 
urban areas, thereby reduces their dependence only on Ulaanbaatar;   
 
- In order to create favorable market environment and deliver high-
quality social services, including health and education services to rural 
population, we need to focus on aimag centers and rural residential 
centers at first; 
 
B) I also included the concept "GROWTH" considering the POVERTY shall be reduced by 
facilitating growth. In recent years, majority of ODA has been granted for the poverty 
reduction purposes. If we detail those measures, most of them, besides measures of health and 
education, were directed toward generating overall economic growth from grassroots level of 
households and cooperatives,  including  creation of independent income sources, business 
education and business entrepreneurship, but not toward meeting temporary needs of foods, 
clothes etc.  Therefore, I intended to see the research from an angle of economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
                      
3 Living Standard Measurement Survey 1998 
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2.2.3 Scale and methodology of the research 
 
In terms of policy and regulation, the research covered all ODA that Mongolia received 
nationwide. And in terms of effectiveness, I sought to reflect its contributions to rural 
development and socioeconomic spheres in a fairly detailed way. I also tried to see the 
research from several different positions: 
• From the position of Mongolian Government- how and by what policy does it 
receive and use ODA;   
• From the position of donor countries and international organizations – how do 
they grant ODA in terms of their policies and regulations as well as linkage with 
policies of Mongolian Government;  
• From the focal position of local community – how do rural people benefit from 
the above aid?  
 
I aimed to find key answers to the main research theme from these position and personally 
visited Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor, Selenge, Dornod, Khentii, Khovd and Zavkhan aimags 
to conduct field researches.  
 
In the framework of this research, I met to exchange opinions with more than 400 individuals 
including those from civil service, public sector, private business sector and project 
implementing unit as well as ordinary citizens and local residents. Besides, I surveyed their 
opinion using questionnaires prepared in two different forms: one for local administration 
officers and civil servant and one for local citizens and businessmen. The research was 
conducted in two ways: personal interviews/field visits and questionnaire. I classified 
participants of the research by their production, service and business types as shown on the 
Appendix 1.  
 
 
2.2.4 ODA research studies and issues for further study 
 
A. Current research studies 
 
Internationally, a large number of research studies about ODA exist. One of those research 
studies, perhaps the one covering the broadest scale and contained considerably well-done 
policy research, was a study, "Assessing Aid", conducted by the World Bank, which covered 
over 50 countries or aid beneficiaries that received ODA for the last 30 years. I broadly used 
this survey in comparing Mongolian situation with other countries.  
 
But, independent research materials, conclusions and recommendations on ODA effectiveness 
and its improvement that specifically focused on Mongolia were very few. Such specific 
reports include:  
- Research report "Recommendations on improvement of foreign aid 
management and coordination"- prepared by research team of the Mongolian 
Society of Irkutsk Economic University in the framework of the UNDP-based 
project "Support to Coordination of External Development Resources”, 2002. 
 
- "Economic Growth of Mongolia and Some Issues to Accelerate the 
Growth" - Academician T.Dorj's speech presented to the First Summit on 
National Productivity in 2002.  
 
- Human Development Report of Mongolia - 2003.  
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B. Issues for further study:  
 
I propose following issues to be studied further: 
  
- ODA conditions proposed by donors at international level and consult the 
Government about options to relieve such conditions; 
 
- Main criteria of project qualifications in countries which used ODA most efficiently 
for accelerating their growth and development, in terms of ODA policies, 
institutional structures and technical and economic feasibility requirements; 
 
- Whether the equipments and facilities supplied by projects implemented by ODA, 
especially from grant aid, are used for their intended purposes, whether the personnel 
work by in their areas of professional training, whether the project established 
structures, systems, and project activities are maintained for the intended purposes; 
 
- Identify or study what percent of ODA continues to run and gives targeted outcomes 
or how many percent of them was short-lived and why they stopped their operations. 
By this research, 17% of all respondents replied that they could run their operations 
fully, in some cases partly, after the end of project outcome, 23% of them replied 
they couldn't run further and rest of 60% answered, "don't know". Therefore, it is 
important to study continuance of foreign aid projects and identify what changes of 
policy and regulation need to be done; 
 
- Need to conduct a survey on prices of goods, products and services supplied by 
ODA. Since the officers received foreign aid products complain a lot that the 
contract prices are too high, we need to study and develop proposal to regulate 
supply policies of aid products.  
 
- It is a common issue that the foreign consultants cost too high. Here we need to study 
the issue and develop methodologies and recommendations for further actions.   
 
 
2.2.5 Problems faced during the research 
 
Some problems faced during the research are described below: 
 
•  It was difficult to get information from central government organizations and 
ministries.  Specifically, the research was mainly conducted in previous months of the 
election when the information collection was very difficult because the MOFE and 
other ministries had taken preventive position not to give out any information. 
(Apparently, there was a ministry directive that officially warned the officers not to 
disclose such information, in order to avoid possible criticism). Also such a "state of 
alert" could be observed commonly at donor project implementation units located at 
ministries.   That is, there was a common trend to "own" information. However, 
information  they own was not so complete and in some cases contrasting with each 
other. 
 
• Also in some cases officers of ministries and government organizations 
showed casual and indifferent attitudes to researcher, by not coming to or avoiding 
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appointments (making excuses concerning their work overload) and by treating them 
as university students that collect materials for writing school work projects. 
 
•  Assessing effectiveness of ODA was made more difficult because responses 
from all levels of government officers were cautious, reflecting a self-protecting 
attitude, avoiding accountability, and providing wishy-washy answers or general 
answers, such as "overall, it was effective".    
 
• ODA awareness was very low among aimag and soum citizens who mostly 
understand ODA to be humanitarian aid and name all assistance simply as "project". 
Also, aimag administration officers called it "project and programme" including 
government programs and foreign aid into one concept. Therefore, it was difficult to 
understand them separately. 
 
• Some efficiency and growth indicators taken to measure rural development, 
such as number of taxpayers or tax income, were no longer usable for the purpose 
because of regular policy shifts, changes in the status of business entities, and transfers 
between local/central budget taxpayers. Numbers of aimag taxpayers issued by aimag 
taxation offices are shown in the Appendix 2.  
 
Chapter 5 shows policy recommendations drawn from the research result, Chapter 3 describes 
background information such as current ODA policies and regulations, amount and scale of 
ODA utilization, and Chapter 4 describes ODA effectiveness on rural development. 
 
 
 
THREE.  ODA IN MONGOLIA 
 
3.1. Amount, scale and possible outcome of ODA  
 
Using main indicators that show economic and aid dependence rates of a country, I compared 
ODA status of Mongolia with over 50 developing countries, including East European and 
Central Asian countries similarly developing in transition from centrally planned to market 
economy and other developing and less developed countries received large amounts of loans 
and aid or shifted their development status in the last 30 years. Mongolia received and used in 
total 2.5 billion US$ of ODA between 1991-2002. Each year Mongolia had received 824  US$ 
of ODA per capita, by the average of 1993-2001 and by this indicator, Mongolia was ranked 
in the second place among the world countries (not including Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
4 http//www.oecd.org/statistics and World Development Indicators 2000, 2002 and 2003.  
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Chart 1. 
Chart 1. ODA per capita /Average of 1991-2002/   
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Source: http://www.oecd.org/statistics and World Development Indicators 2000, 2002 and 2003 
  
Each year Mongolia received ODA equals to 17-32 percent of its annual GDP (21.7% - World 
Development Indicators 2000, 2002 and 2003) in average and today it is one of 5 countries 
highly dependent on aid.   
 
             Table 1. ODA, Mongolia received between 1991-2002                    
/in million USD/  
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
ODA  258 141 195 221 215 196 244 207 238 174 213 174 
GDP(by 
nominal rate) 
473 146 493 785 1227 1179 1054 972 906 970 1014 1107 
GDP (by the 
rate of 1995 ) 
1217 1101 1068 1093 1162 1189 1237 1280 1322 1336 1349 1404 
ODA/GDP 
(by nominal 
rate) 
55% 97% 40% 28% 18% 17% 23% 21% 26% 18% 21% 16% 
ODA/GDP 
(by the rate 
of 1995 ) 
21% 13% 18% 20% 19% 17% 20% 16% 18% 13% 16% 16% 
Source: 1. Ministry of Finance and Economy, Mongolia, ‘Effectiveness & Contributions of ODA for 
Mongolia”. Mongolia Consultative Group Meeting. November 19-21, 2003. Tokyo, Japan 
2. National Statistical Office, Statistical bulletin 1989-2002 
3. Third year result of joint research project on economic reform and development "Using ODA effectively in 
Mongolia", August 15-16, 1997 
 
 
Table 2 shows aid dependence rate of Mongolia by the average of 1991-2002, as published on 
the book World Development Indicators. 
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Table 2. Aid dependence rate of Mongolia  
/by the average of 1991-2002/  
 
Indicators Average From the 
top 
1. Average amount of ODA per capita (USD/year)    
(not including Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
82.0 3 
2.  ODA/GDP (%) 17.0 4 
3. ODA/ Total investment (%) 75.1 6 
4. ODA/ Import (%)  31.2 5 
5. ODA/ Government budget expenditure (%)    83.0 2 
 
The above table shows that Mongolia is among the world's leading countries in terms of ODA 
received per capital. Here alerts that it turns to be a country with vulnerable economy overly 
dependent on foreign aid.  
 
Being dependent on aid means the government of the country is no longer able to perform its 
main functions such as basic social services without foreign aid resources and consultation.  
Here includes countries that receive aid equals to 10 or more percent of their GDP. Number of 
such countries reached over 30 by 2000.  Aid dependence is measured by aid "intensity". 
Statistical research on the indicators of many countries showed that very strong negative 
relationship existed between aid intensity and quality of governance. That is, aid intensity was 
adversely affected by poor quality of governance. Also it was proved that continuous receipt 
of aid for a long term is a factor of worsening governance and institutional structure and 
slowing development.  Even though Mongolia has not received aid for a long time, the 
amount equals to 20% of GDP suggests likelihood of being in trouble.    
 
On the other hand, there is a necessity to check whether Mongolia's society and economy 
developed rapidly as its ODA rank would suggest, as one of the top recipients in the world. In 
order to make this check, I used as a basic benchmark the "Assessing Aid" policy research 
(1998) conducted by the World Bank, which covered over 50 countries or aid beneficiaries 
that received ODA for the last 30 years. As summarized by this research report, ODA brings 
high level of benefits to countries with well-defined socioeconomic policies, sound 
organization of institutional structures and governments that work lawfully toward providing 
better government service or consistently make efforts to keep the service as  good as it 
should be. For instance, the report defined that it is possible for a country, received ODA 
equals to 1% of its GDP and used it properly as mentioned above, to attain following 
outcomes: 
• 2.2-3.7 % increase in GDP per capita  
• 0.5%  increase in GDP growth  
• 1% poverty reduction 
• Attract private investment equals to 1.9% of GDP 
• 1% reduction in infant mortality   
 
Examples of countries that successfully used ODA for overcoming crisis and achieving a high 
level of development include Korea in 1960s, Indonesia in 1970s, Bolivia and Ghana in 
1980s, and both Uganda and Vietnam in 1990s.  
 
But, on the other hand, countries like Congo and Tanzania that received billions of USD of 
ODA for several decades could not achieve any development or progress because of their 
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weak policies and regulations, technical or managerial incompetence, and corruption.  Instead 
of progress, ODA loans left these countries among the most heavily indebted poor countries. 
Tanzania was granted 2 billion USD of ODA for 20 years, only for the purpose of road 
construction. But it was ineffective because the constructed roads were eroded and damaged 
quicker than the construction could take place, because of a lack of necessary repair works.  
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned World Bank research summary, I estimated some 
indicators to check what levels Mongolia's major socioeconomic indicators might have 
reached if Mongolia had used properly the ODA received between 1991-2002. According to 
my estimation, it was possible for Mongolia's GDP per capita to reach 4700.00 USD, instead 
of the current (approximately) 400.00 USD. By the most modest estimation, taking into 
account the vast territory and scarce population factors that would adversely effect ODA 
effectiveness, a reasonable expectation for Mongolia's GDP per capita should be at least 
1700.00 USD. That is, I assumed here that our GDP per capita was likely to increase by only 
1 percent, which is a half of the minimum possible growth, as result of the ODA equals to 1% 
of our GDP.  
                                                                           Chart 2.   
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Poverty level has been officially measured since 1995.  However, highly efficient use of the 
ODA we received since that time would have reduced the poverty level from 36.3% to 21.6.   
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 Chart 3.  
Poverty level
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Moreover, the chart below shows a comparison that indicates real investment would have 
reached the level- 9 times higher than the current level.  
                                                                                               
                                                                                                     Chart 4.  
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In other words, it was possible for Mongolia's GDP per capita to be some 3 to 10 times 
higher than today's actual level, for the poverty level to be reduced down to 21.6%, and infant 
mortality to be lowered by 3 to 4 times from its current level, reaching 7 per 1000 live births. 
Also it was estimated that the domestic investment would have been 9 times higher than the 
current level. 
 
 
3.2. Current policies and regulations of receiving ODA 
 
Main document on foreign aid policy and regulation is the Law of Mongolia on Foreign Aid 
Regulations, enacted in June 2003 and other documents include Law on International 
Treaties, annual state budget laws of Mongolia, "Procedure for regulating official 
development loans and aid the Government of Mongolia receives from foreign countries and 
international organizations" approved by the Government Resolution No. 93 of 1999 and 
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"Procedure on Foreign Aid Coordination Council and its rules", revised by the Government 
Resolution No. 152 of 2000.    
 
Although a new law on foreign aid regulation was adopted, the above-mentioned procedures 
approved by the government resolutions, which were basic regulatory documents before the 
law, are still valid. So it is  necessary to amend those procedures in line with the new law. 
  
According to the new law, foreign assistance shall: 
- Be closely linked with medium-term development strategy, long run strategy 
and state budget investment plans;  
- Regard common interests of the country;  
- Have concessional terms if it is a loan;  
- Have low total costs of consultancy service; 
- Reflect production and repair costs in technical and economic terms as well as 
technological, socioeconomic and environmental requirements and loan 
efficiency calculations in the feasibility study, according to relevant legal acts.  
- A project loan has a basic requirement that total domestic funding shall include 
domestic tax relief and exemption as well as costs of domestically supplied 
products and services. 
 
 Although the above requirements were generally reflected in effective government 
resolutions enforced before enactment of the new law, it is  doubtful to conclude that  both so 
far implemented or under implementation projects could meet above requirements being truly 
economically efficient.   For example, Dornod thermal power station was repaired with 11.6 
million Euros of project loan. Today this power station operates smoothly, but it uses only up 
to 20 percent of its capacity due to low market demand and still receives subsidy from state 
budget. Therefore, we should review whether its economic efficiency was correctly 
calculated, whether the reality was reflected in medium-term development strategy of the 
project and whether future demand  and supply of  the region was  estimated . Similarly, we 
need to review technical and economic feasibilities of large-scale investment projects and  
establish economic efficiency criteria for each stage of decision-making and evaluation for 
further projects and measures lawfully. Moreover, ongoing monitoring on project 
implementation and follow-up performance evaluation mechanisms need to be reflected in 
relevant laws. 
 
According to the law, central public administration organization in charge of foreign aid 
affairs shall have duties to ”... review projects received from ministries in line with medium-
term development strategy, far-reaching objective, state budget, investment plan, overall 
significance, socioeconomic effectiveness  as well as policies and regulations of partners and 
submit to the Cabinet for discussion and decision-making". Besides, the law states that it has 
the authority to conduct technical and economic feasibility studies and analysis on programs, 
projects and measures implemented by foreign aid. Here we can see that this organization is a 
sole authority that makes decision to spend ODA on efficient projects. However, whether or 
not to undertake an economic feasibility study or estimation is a decision left  to the 
organization since that action is not mandatory. The law says that the central public 
administration organization in charge of foreign aid affairs, shall review project proposals 
from sectoral ministries, submit the review for Cabinet discussion, propose supported projects 
to donors according to relevant procedures, and sign a contract jointly with project applicant. 
On the other hand,  the Parliament is authorized to ratify loan agreements. Diagram 1 shows 
how procedures to receive foreign aid are reflected in the Law on foreign aid regulation. 
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Diagram 1.  
 
 
 
Above procedures shows only the stage where the proposal has reached government level, 
therefore the diagram does not illustrate how local and grassroots level initiatives shall reach 
government level passing other preliminary stages. Even at the upper level, procedures were 
not legislated to be simple and easy. Although the law stated that the Cabinet should discuss 
all foreign aid proposals, currently practiced actual procedures were quite different from the 
above, in which MOFE receives project proposals from sectoral ministries, reviews whether 
they meet cooperation program directions of the donor and submits to the Foreign Aid 
Coordination Council (FACC) for discussion. Although FACC was re-established by 
Government Resolution No. 152 of year 2000, the structure was not reflected in the new law. 
FACC aims to coordinate efficient use of ODA and foreign aid related activities and its 
membership includes the Minister of Finance and Economy as a chairman and other members 
including Vice Ministers, the First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mongolia and the Chief 
of Cabinet Secretariat.   It makes decisions to submit some projects for Cabinet discussion, 
some projects to return, and some to send directly to donors. Even it is not legally binding, 
FACC is accustomed to negotiating contracts on the loan projects appraised by Cabinet 
discussion, and then the SGH  ratifies them automatically. Such practice of approval after 
discussion is good, but the automatic approval of all loan projects raises doubt whether the 
SGH makes decision after scrutinizing their economic efficiency, significance and effect on 
development or just approves them directly without taking responsibility because of political 
pressure and under procedural constraint from donors.       
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Central public 
administration 
organization in 
charge of 
foreign aid 
Cabinet 
Supported projects Central public 
administration 
organization in 
charge of foreign 
aid together with 
sectoral ministries
 
Cabinet member in  charge of foreign 
aid (except specially authorized by the 
Cabinet) 
Project proposal  
State Great Hural  
(ratifies only loan agreements) 
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Diagram on procedures to receive ODA
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Also the central government authority in charge of foreign aid affairs is legislated to have a 
duty to maintain foreign aid registration and database. We should appreciate that Treasury 
Department of MOFE completely maintains compiled registration of ODA loans along with 
detailed repayment schedules. Loans are registered to the above information database on their 
starting day of disbursement. Although the MOFE Department of Economic Cooperation 
Management and Coordination is responsible for maintaining grant aid database, what they 
have done was almost incomplete and not regularly updated. Information of this database 
radically contrasted with information received from donors and in many cases grants aid  
information was  not reflected in full programs and projects and some of them had different 
names. For example; 
 
USAID-based:  
- Agricultural Bank Reform project,  
- Competitiveness Initiative project  
ADB-based  
- ÒÀ- 2720 "Improving Banking System Control and 
Restructuring" project with funding of  1.0 million USD 
- ÒÀ -3208 Technical Assistance Loan for Improving Banking 
System Restructuring with funding of 220.0 thousand USD 
 
Unlike loans, disbursement and utilization of grant aid do not flow through single window, so 
that MOFE has little chance to compile all of them into one integrated database. 
  
However, in comparison to previous years when there was no permanent structure of 
coordinating ODA affairs where several ministries involved concurrently, significant 
progresses of aid coordination have been made in the last four years. The new law somewhat 
eliminated power conflicts among ministries and their attempts to handle aid affairs 
individually, in particularly the coordination of a development loan is now being handled by 
one corporate hand.  
 
 Although the MOFE, central government authority in charge of aid affairs, has few numbers 
of staffs, they bear a big responsibility of handling major development policy issues of 
Mongolia including national economic development strategy; budget policy, their planning 
and implementation; and ODA coordination. Besides, they take responsibility of organizing 
implementations, directly and indirectly. Therefore, it makes the ministry too overloaded and 
unable to perform its main functions and concentrate on its main objectives properly. Due to 
their aspiration to cover budget losses by any means, today the MOFE turned to be a ministry 
that tends to look everything through a window of budget, acquiesces any financial terms of 
ODA with that purpose, and focuses their attention on raising budget income According to the 
law and other procedures that used to be effective, the MOFE is obliged to conduct economic 
feasibility study and analysis on each loan request or proposal, but basically they do not 
perform this function in practice. It is not reasonable to assume that the ministry performs 
everything with its few staffs, including those works such as preparing materials for annual 
donors' meeting, reviewing and scrutinizing each projects proposed for approximately 300 
million USD of loans and aid pledged by the meeting, estimating their economic efficiency 
and receiving actual funding officially, besides handling their function to record and update 
the database of loans and grant aid.  In other words, today staffs in ministries just work on 
daily routine matters, but they lack functions to perform socio-economic efficiency analyses 
and feasibility studies on national-level projects and measures and provide economically 
justifiable consulting to the Cabinet. 
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Besides, previous studies show that  professional officers of core ministries have low level of 
capacity and stability. Despite a law on civil servants exists effective,  here we should be 
critical that the law is not always obeyed.  Moreover, work lags have been created due to 
incapacity of illegally recruited personnel just aimed to study abroad in developed countries 
under government scholarship, but  unable to perform functions stated by laws. Especially for 
ODA, such illegal practices create grounds for implementing inefficient loan projects, further 
increasing budget debts and creating budget overload. 
 
Although the main policy document- Law on foreign aid regulation- stated that a number of 
regulatory documents needs to be developed, so far none of them was officially issued, but 
still in their draft phases at ministries. For instance, 
 
- Procedure on registering foreign aid granted in the form of goods and products 
- Procedure on domestic on-lending of foreign aid resources and its contract 
form 
- Procedure on project implementation report 
- Medium-term program on receiving foreign aid 
- Procedure and guideline on requesting necessary documents and materials 
from relevant bodies 
- Procedure on reporting storage, protection, usage and expenditure of foreign 
aid resources 
- Procedure on creation and use of foreign aid records and information database 
 
In early 1990s, foreign aid affairs were basically coordinated by donors' management, but 
today it is appreciable that some sectoral ministries started to make attempts to do own 
coordination. But the outcomes have not been significantly effective yet.  It is common for 
several donor projects to include a part of similar activities reflected in little different ways.  
For example, well drilling and repairing activity was reflected in different ways in 8-9 
projects and programs including Agricultural Development Project (ADB), Sustainable 
Livelihood Support Project (WB), Rural Poverty Reduction Project (IFAD), Sustainable 
Pastureland Management Project (UNDP, the Netherlands), and other World Vision, ADRA 
and JICA projects. However, initiative for joint harmonization activities to improve aid 
outcome and effectiveness was raised at the Donor Meeting, held in in November, 2003 in 
Tokyo and started to make attempts in some sectoral levels. For instance, a working group for 
studying possibilities to incorporate multi-source financing of well drilling and repairing 
activities was established at the MOFA and they have produced a report.  This is a quite 
positive step toward improving coordination. In restoring over 30 thousand wells and building 
new ones, the probability of overlapping is low, though medium and long-term efficiency 
results from implementing projects under one incorporated coordination  shall be increased, as 
we also need to coordinate their further repairing services and pastureland management 
issues. Say that MoFE  coordinates its activities with donor countries and organizations by 
each cooperation field, but the ministry uses it mainly for project selection purposes. In terms 
of territorial coordination, they started to make some attempts. A clear example is, they 
agreed on concepts and directions to cooperate with Germany and indicated that the 
cooperation shall concentrate territorially on Tuv and Selenge region as well as Zavkhan 
aimag.        
 
Over 30% of total ODA and almost a half of total  concessional loans were spent only on 
infrastructure including road construction, energy sector restoration, communication sector 
development and improvement of public utilities, which accorded to the policies of several 
governments aimed to develop  hard infrastructure for economic development since 1990s. In 
this field, policies and implementations have been well linked. As result,  today coverage of 
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telecomunication services has been improved radically and all forms of telecommunication 
such as telephone or mobile communication and internet connection have been completely 
introduced at aimag and city level and even in some cases reached soum level. Also distance 
education facilities have been connecting aimags and cities.  Moreover, almost all aimags 
except for three aimags have been connected to central power line, which means preliminary 
conditions for production and business development have been created in aimags.  Large scale 
road construction works have improved roads between three big cities and some central 
aimags, thereby undoubtedly accelerates economic turnover of the region.       
 
However, what we undervalued here are the industrial and agricultural sectors that produce 
over 50% of our GDP,  which have used 13% of total ODA and merely 15% of total loans. In 
contrast, education, health and social security sectors received more ODA than these sectors, 
which does not accord to government policies for growth generation, poverty reduction and 
export promotion  
 
The central government authority in charge of foreign aid affairs, sectoral ministries and 
aimag and capital city Governors shall monitor implementation of approved projects, as stated 
in law. Officials of ministries, agencies and local administration bodies say that they exercise 
control on project financing, but I did not feel such control in reality. Donors control 
implementations to certain extents according to their criteria, procedures and guidelines. From 
the side of Mongolia, almost no controlling system that monitors actual performances with 
systematic analyses and evaluation is available, except for timely responses to donors' request 
and concentration on expenditure of resources.   It is associated with fact that there are no 
clear performance criteria for monitoring and evaluation and proper monitoring mechanism. 
Though monitoring and evaluation divisions were established within ministries at the time of  
previous government, so far they couldn't place substantial controls. For example, Monitoring 
and evaluation division of the Ministry of Infrastructure, where largest amount of ODA 
projects are implemented, does not evaluate implementing aid projects or project proposals. 
Even when they try to monitor and evaluate  one or two implemented projects, they do not 
know how to measure their performances. 
 
On the other hand, projects proposed by donors' side are often too far-sighted and use overly 
optimistic assumptions about price and tariff policies and regulations, thereby shows the 
project look efficient. But in practice, those optimist assumptions do not match reality, so that 
today there are many cases in which ODA loan investments have been working inefficiently.  
For example,  the project investment for improving public utilities in five western aimags has 
not still yielded its economic efficiency and created capacity to repay loan principal and 
interest payments. It was socially significant project, but those entities had to repay the loan 
according to the on-lending contracts couldn't increase their sales tariff rates up to the level of 
initial project assumption and had to work economically inefficient.    
  
Also the World Bank loan project of 35 million USD was implemented in Baganuur coal 
mining, where 40 percent of heavy machineries supplied by the projects has been broken. But 
now the coal mining operates and supplies its products normally.  It shows that we also need 
to review how  capacity and number of machineries and equipments selected by projects 
correlated with other factors like personnel, repair and maintenance as well as supply of spare 
parts. 
 
Both project implementors and donors criticize that project effectiveness reduces as long as its 
implementation lags; and they explain it in connection with following reasons: 
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• Government does not keep what they promised in the 
framework of projects and programs or does not hold consistent 
stance. For example, it delays finances from government resources, 
doesn't take measures to prepare in advance etc.  
• Sectoral ministries and MOFE are incapable of drafting projects 
to meet donors' requirements. They just propose something like a list 
of  wishes. 
• There is a common concept that donors shall implement 
projects themselves. 
• They do not care project outcomes, instead, put more 
importance on training, facilities and study trips. 
• There are many bureacratic stages of decision making and each 
organization throws issues to one another. Basically, all issues are 
resolved by reaching the top  level. Here wastes a lot of time.  
 
Official government reporting is limited by only quantitative expression of ODA in input 
stage and public reporting limited by just TV shows on signing ceremonies of received 
projects or tape cutting ceremonies for imported goods, machineries and equipments, running 
newspaper advertisement on those ceremonies for the public, while there is no reporting and 
accountability system  on actual outcomes achieved after completion of the projects.  For  
only last two months of observation, many of such kind of ceremonial news appeared on TV 
and daily newspapers simultaneously for one day, while news on evaluation of actual project 
outcomes almost did not appear to the public.   
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
 Summary of current situation of ODA policies and regulations can be made in general: 
 
- Inadequate ODA  policy and regulation. National long and medium term development 
policy priorities are not clear, they cover all socioeconomic sectors and list all of them, and it 
is  not clear whether government prioritized certain issues. ODA policies and coordination are 
inadequate. Basically there is no development policy and planning on ODA utilization. The 
new law enacted in 2003 defined general foreign aid policy, stating "Foreign aid shall regard 
mid-term development strategy, long-term vision, state fiscal and investment plans and 
common national interests". Besides, the law prescribed   common requirements for ODA 
projects and measures as well as authorities and duties of governmentc organizations in 
receiving and implementing ODA. However, actual practices  do not meet above 
requirements and conditions;  and government organizations still decide issues on ad-hoc 
basis, not performing their duties and activities properly as stated in the law. Also, lack of 
clearly stated direction and sectoral priority list on ODA utilization leads to approve projects 
with best solicit and political lobby.    On the other hand, ministries have a desire to receive 
foreign aid as much as possible and to manage its implementation by themselves, which is 
another factor influences the selection process. Initiative for donor to donor and donor to 
government coordination was frequently raised, but so far no significant outcome has been is 
achieved.  
 
- Does not regard economic efficiency as a main indicator, especially for loans; Directions 
for donors' aid and cooperation are well maintained, but they are not used as a basis for 
project selection and correct estimation of economic efficiency. Since today there is almost no 
evaluation mechanism for receiving and utilised loans, still exists possibility for receiving 
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economically inefficient loans further.   They seek appraisal for projects that show high level 
of social importance and indefinite economic efficiency or too far-sighted dream of efficiency 
and submit  them to donors, even their economic efficiency is not clear. They receive loans 
that prioritised social services but economically ineffective in the near future. Large 
investment objects constructed and restored by loan resources suffer losses for several years 
starting from their date of operation and receive budget subsidies. 
 
- The Foreign Aid Coordination Council that was established to coordinate aid before 
enactment of the law (but no longer in the new law) still works to date, discusses and makes 
decisions on projects. Although officials say that this council operates now to facilitate 
Cabinet meeting; it works under influence of its members, who wanted to include own 
sectoral projects, and in some cases under manipulation and attempts of political officials, 
including MPs, who wanted to influence the decision making by misuse of their power, 
rather than really facilitating the  Cabinet meeting by screening projects according to their 
major socioeconomic effectiveness, efficiency and outcome indicators.   
 
- They overly follow interests, requirements and conditions proposed by donors and ready to 
accept any terms in case of  receiving money and finance, which accords to the practice that 
the political officials are led by their desire to obtain  as much as possible during their term 
of office. Some ministries and agencies often take initiatives to attach their opinion and 
request what they need, but they do not always succeed due to lack of consistent system.    
 
- Don't attach much importance to repayment- this attitude blurs future repayment burden 
and creates public awareness that all of them are grant aid; but portion of grant aid in ODA is 
too low in comparison to other low and middle income countries, instead, at the level of high 
income countries. According to "International Development Statistics-2004", grant aid portion 
in total ODA is 65-71% for low and middle-income countries. The portion is 57% for high-
income countries, but it is 53% for Mongolia. Therefore, we should work toward maintaining 
loan and grant aid ratio of 30:70 in receiving ODA. 
 
- Ministries and agencies accustomed to submit a compiled list of wishes for a dare. For 
ODA loan projects, professional officers of ministries and agencies accustomed to submit a 
compiled list of wishes, rather than paying their time and effort, concentrating on socio-
economic analyses at each level and deciding on really efficient projects to be submitted to 
upper organization. 
 
- Lack of relationship between Budget framework statement (investment program) and 
ODA. Mongolian government budget and ODA seem to relate each other only when some 
objects covered by larger ODA program or projects have to be eliminated from budget 
framework statement. But it is occasional or on ad hock basis. That is, not all ODA programs 
and projects are reflected in investment plans of the budget framework statement. Since there 
is no such system to reflect them all, the MOFE's Investment division is incapable to handle 
the task due to lack of human resource.   
 
- No decision-making authority at lower levels. Local community has a common 
understanding and expectation that 'Everything comes down from above' since there is no 
policy environment to make initiative, receive and utilise ODA. Even there were cases that 
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some loan users did not know that their loans came in actually, as mentioned in the previous 
research5. In other words, all issues must reach the top level in order to be resolved. 
 
- Inadequate and nontransparent information.  ODA information is nontransparent to the 
public. Such information and reports officially exchanged between government organizations 
and donors are incomplete and measured only by total amounts of  received resources. Donor 
consultants cited examples that in some cases the ministries deliberately conceal information 
or accidentally mislead donors, resulting in a waste of time and resources on overlapped 
activities.  A complex performance-based system of information and reporting has not been 
created yet. 
 
- - No controlling system at all levels. Mongolian government, 
ministries, implementing agencies and aid recipients all have no 
effective control at all levels and for all stages of implementation, from 
project initiative to completion as well as follow up stages.  
 
 
FOUR. ODA ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 ODA projects and programms in rural areas  
 
Defining ODA contribution to rural development was problematic, with very little 
identification. Since significant number of projects aim at nationwide, macro-level reforms 
and restructuring, it is not reasonable to consider them non-rural. Also, we cannot isolate 
banking and financial sector capacity building and their service quality improvement projects 
from rural development. But, if we just exclude few large scale targeted projects and general-
purpose reform projects such as aid in the form of food and goods, World Bank project 
"Improving public utilities in UB city", ADB project "Housing finance", "Buyant Ukhaa 
airport", which are implemented only in Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and Erdenet from the main 
database, and pick up the projects closely associated with rural areas; then 58.8% of total 
loans and 38.8% of total grant aid in our totally disbursed ODA were utilized in rural areas. 
(Table 3)    
 
Table 3. Share of ODA amounts & projects associated with rural areas. 
 
By volume of funding  
Loan Grant aid 
Total ODA (million USD)  1255 1221 
ODA utilization in 1991-1993  269.62 219.96 
ODA utilization in 1994-2002 985.38 1001.4 
Percent of ODA disbursement for projects and activities 
associated with rural areas  
58.8 38.8 
 
The above estimation is based on government database of ODA loans and grant aid and 
covered projects directly and indirectly associated with rural areas and implemented in 1994-
2002. But here I did not include projects completed before 1996 and non-relevant loans and 
grant aid as well as emergency and food assistance.   
 
                      
5  Research report named "Recommendations on improvement of foreign aid management and coordination"- 
prepared by research team of the Mongolian Association of Irkutsk Economic University in the framework of the 
UNDP-based project " Support to Coordination of External Development Resources”,  2002. 
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From above table we can assume that significant portion of total received ODA was disbursed 
in rural areas. However, it was impossible to estimate number of projects and measures and 
amount of aid disbursement  by each aimag or local area.  
 
Out of aimags covered by the research, Governor's Office of Selenge aimag took first 
initiative of organizing information exchange meeting on foreign aid projects implemented in 
the aimag, which was also supported by the Open Society Forum that organizes this research. 
The meeting, held on May 29 of this year, was an effective measure for exchanging 
information at aimag level and increasing participants' awareness on effects and importance of 
foreign aid to local development. As result of this measure, we produced a "List of foreign aid 
projects implemented in Selenge aimag", shown in the Appendix 4, which can be starting 
point of having complete database on foreign aid projects implemented in the aimag level. 
The list gives opportunity to see generally what kind of projects and measures are 
implemented in local level of aimags.  
 
Though we made attempts to draw a complete list of projects implemented in Selenge aimag, 
it was impossible to express them in their volumes of funding. Therefore, we had to use a 
press release issued by the Governor of Zavkhan aimag, who said that the aimag implemented 
in total 15-16 million USD of projects for the last four years. If we use this amount as an 
aimag average, it was estimated roughly that total number of 21 aimags had received 
approximately 300-400 million USD of ODA in the last four years, which was fairly close to 
the above amount of documentation.    
 
When we analyzed activity components, especially for poverty reduction projects 
implemented in rural areas, most of them were physical and intellectual forms of investments 
aimed at income generation, improvement of business environment and creation of small and 
medium business activities. That is, most of the foreign aid activities6 were directed to the 
securing "growth" that we mentioned earlier in the project terminology section.  
 
Basically, none of local administration and private sector people has a belief that aimag or 
local initiatives can be realized and implemented. There are two reasons: first, poor capacity 
to write a project in rural areas, second, no mechanism to make local initiatives agenda for 
upper decision making.     
 
 
4.2 ODA  effectiveness in rural areas  
 
In order to find answers to this question "How rural development has improved in these 
years?" I personally visited seven aimags, namely Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor, Selenge, 
Dornod, Khentii, Khovd and Zavkhan, to conduct field research on ODA utilization and its 
effectiveness on rural development. 
 
Since there is a common awareness that aid comes "down from the top", rural people 
basically have no sense of repayment except for one or two aimag administration officers.  
 
                      
6 These foreign aid projects excluded those projects ended by 1996 and started from 2002; supported import of 
goods and payment balance; addressed to Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan, Erdenet cities including Buyant Ukhaa 
airport loan; and other general-purpose, structural reform projects covered whole national socioeconomic 
spheres.  
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Rural people generally understand ODA and other foreign aid in one concept of humanitarian 
aid. And they comment that local administration people, especially soum and bag governors 
and their close relatives, benefit from the aid.  
 
According to survey result based on question “How ODA affected improvement of citizens' 
living standards?”, over 80% of aimag and local administration officers and 10% of 
businessmen and NGO officers evaluated that it affected positively, while local residents 
answered, "don't know at all" or "no difference". They criticized, "People say that aid come, 
but actually local administration people take all themselves", specially addressing to bagh, 
khoroo and soum governors.  
 
Generally, the survey result on whether foreign aid had positive contributions to the aimag 
and local  development shows that 44% of survey participants answered "don't know", 18.3% 
of them evaluated that "they had good effects", 15.9% of them responded "to some extent", 
and 21.7% of them evaluated critically.  
 
                                                                                                                            Chart 5. 
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To the question, "Could you run foreign aid projects effectively and continiously after the end 
of project implementation? ", only 6% of respondents answered 'YES', while 60.2% of them 
answered 'DON’T KNOW' and 23.2% of them responded 'NO'. 
 
If we list the projects actually felt and known well today by local people, according to their 
interviews and responses to our questionnaire, they numbered over 40, but few of them were 
popular or commonly known and felt by local citizens. Here they are shown in the following 
table.  
 
  
Table 4. 10 projects most popular among rural people 
   
Name of project Donor country or 
organization 
1. Sustainable livelihoods project  World Bank 
2. Gobi initiative project USA 
3. Regional development program and other projects -1991  World Vision  
4. Education and information projects  Soros Foundation 
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5. Reproductive health FRG 
6. Grassroots  Japan 
7. Health sector development program I & II ADB 
8. Provincial town urban service improvement project  ADB 
9. Children's education projects Save the Children UK  
10. Agricultural sector development  ADB 
Despite a few projects mentioned in the above table could actually reach their targets in rural 
areas, it was observed that some other projects such as USAID-based "Gobi initiative" 
project, the World Vision programs, renewable energy projects and measures of German 
Technical Cooperation Agency, and projects of Norwegian aid organization, contributed in 
improving livelihoods and economies of rural population.      
 
Also, I observed that mostly central project offices coordinated project implementations in 
rural areas and the full amount of resources allocated from centers did not always reach their 
rural targets.            
 
Only 2% of rural people and businessmen participated in the questionnaire responded that 
they were involved in ODA projects and programs; and 6% out of 98% of those who had 
never been involved, answered that they tried to be involved but failed. There is only little 
chance to be involved in small projects announced through the Sustainable livelihood project. 
Therefore, it was possible to conclude from the above situation that a very little part of ODA 
projects and activities went to private sector, where rural businessmen had no access at all.   
 
The above ratio was similarly maintained in their participation to foreign aid project and 
programme tenders, as shown in the Chart 6.  
 
                                                                                                                          Chart 6. 
 
 
Rural businessmen all criticize that "When commercial banks provide on-lending from the 
ODA concessional loans with original 0.5-1% annual interest rate to rural businessmen at 
commercial loan rates or too high annual interest rates of 30-42% and reduces the ODA loan 
terms of 20-30 years down to less than one year, thereby the ODA loan loses its meaning of 
ODA and makes rural businesses impossible to run". On the other hand, amount of the loan is 
very small, as if it was lent only for short-term livelihood, but not for conducting larger scale 
of businesses.  
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The majority of civil servants interviewed or who responded to our questionnaire expressed 
their opinion that a better use of ODA would be in social sectors, especially in education 
sector. But 90% of businessmen preferred to lend more ODA loans directly to local 
businessmen with low interest rate and longer term, which would be important for developing 
local production and services and improving repayment for businessmen. Although rural 
businessmen did not deny spending ODA in social sectors, they concluded that local social 
sectors could be improved by local economic development if we first invest in economic 
sector, in particularly the private sector. 
 
42 percent of total rural ODA was utilized in hard infrastructure such as road construction, 
telecommunication and energy sectors, 19 percent in social sectors such as human resource 
development, health and social welfare, while only 8 percent of them allocated in agricultural 
sector and just 3 percent in industry.  Table 5 and Chart 7 illustrate this allocation.  
 
Table .  ODA utilized in rural areas- by main sectors7  
 
SECTOR  LOAN  GRANT AID TOTAL 
Social sectors (human resource 
development, education, health, social 
welfare) 
7% 36% 19% 
Infrastructure 66% 6% 42% 
Agriculture  7% 11% 8% 
Industry  3% 4% 3% 
Banking & finance  11% 2% 8% 
Other  6% 41% 20% 
 
 
Total ODA utulized in rural areas - by sectors         Chart 7 
 
 
The situation inevitably led me to examine how is the ODA utilization in infrastructure as a 
basic condition for securing growth and in health and education sectors as indirect factors for 
securing growth in local aimags.  
 
 
                      
7 From the list of projects directly and indirectly associated with rural areas (excluding those projects completed 
before 1996 and started from 2002, as well as urban city and special object projects) 
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4.2.1 ODA effectiveness in rural infrastructure 
 
People did not always remember investments and aid directed to infrastructure, social sectors 
and intellectual capacity building fields when they asked.  But when we remind them and ask 
how did they affect you, they just remembered how they were before and started to feel actual 
outcomes. In other words, ODA contribution to road construction and power sector had 
already started to show their effects on people's livings and people got used to them forgetting 
past problems, thereby no longer regarded them in their evaluation. Over 30% of total ODA 
and over 40% of total  ODA utilized in rural areas were spent for this sector, as result of  
infrastructural development policy that has been included in the list of government priority 
issues for the last decade. By virtue of well linked policies and implementations maintained in 
this sector,  today coverage of telecomunication services has been improved radically and all 
forms of telecommunication such as telephone or mobile communication and internet 
connection have been completely introduced at aimag and city level and even in some cases 
reached soum level. Also distance education facilities have been connecting aimags and cities.  
Moreover, almost all aimags except for three aimags have been connected to central power 
line, which means preliminary conditions for production and business development have been 
created in aimags.  Also in some aimags, namely in Zavkhan aimag, a German aid project, 
Japanese and Chinese aid provided with renewable energy sources for about 30 percent of 
rural herdsmen and thereby increased their number of information sources such as TV. Also it 
was pleased to visit a private company established in the aimag for repairing solar and wind 
energy sources, which had become daily necessity of   herdsmen.   
 
Large scale road construction works have improved roads between three big cities and some 
central aimags, thereby undoubtedly accelerates economic turnover of the region.       
 
7% of questionnaire respondents including ordinary citizens, businessmen and local 
administration people, responded that foreign aid invested in road construction, 
communication and power affected rural development very well, 66.4% of them responded 
'well', and 23.7% of them answered 'poor' (Chart 6).  People working in this sector criticized 
that ODA project investments are not so efficient; especially equipments and technologies 
invested in communication, energy and health sectors do not operate in their full capacities, 
and explained reasons. However, machineries and mechanisms supplied by Japanese 
government aid and later transferred for the use of private road construction companies have 
been used very well and fully operated by their workers, which shows a clear example of 
highly efficient use of ODA in private sector.  
 
Significant portions of ODA resources were spent on road construction, but it was observed 
that the roads were damaged lacking necessary maintenance and service and people had to go 
by side-roads. So we need to pay attention on quality requirements of newly constructed roads 
and review current methods of selecting contractors. Seems that we need to direct more 
activities of Monitoring and evaluation department of the Ministry  of Infrastructure to  this 
end  and involve them actively from the beginning of project selection stage. Also we need to 
improve road maintenance and service management and increase budget resources, rather 
than start constructing a new road.  
  
To a question that whether repair and maintenance costs for infrastructure constructions 
reflected well enough in state budgets, 77.4% of respondents answered 'No', 20% of them 
answered 'Don't know' and only 2.6% of them responded 'Yes'. But, most of those answered 
'Yes' evaluated that even they were reflected enough in fiscal accounts, they are not fully used 
for their purposes and in most cases they were spent on poor-quality services performed 
through personal relationships with contractors. Chart 8&9  
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Chart 8.                   
How do you assess the contribution of energy, road and 
communication in the development of the area? 
Well
66%
Do not know
3%
Bad
24%
Extraordinarily well7%
 
 
 
 
Chart 9. 
Do maintenance budget sufficiently allocated?
Yes 
3%
No
77%
Do not know
20%
 
 
 
4.2.2 ODA effectiveneess in rural education 
 
Large amount of ODA was also utilized by education sector. Over 10% of total ODA or about 
250 million USD was spent for human resource development. In particularly, when we 
interview people about foreign aid invested in general education schools, teachers of some 
schools remember its benefit, while parents completely denied it and students responded that 
the situation was same as usual.  This puts forward a question how aid invested in this sector, 
particularly in the framework of general education training, were utilized effectively. A 
number of donors that focus much of their aid on this sector include Japan, ADB, Soros 
Foundation, and UN organizations. According to a report of MOECS, school attendance and 
number of dormitory students are drastically increased as a result of improvements in repair 
and maintenance of school and dormitory buildings.   
 
Also it was observed during the course of this research that donor assistance took various 
forms. For instance, Japan, through the Mongolian Government, assists in construction and 
maintenance of school buildings, while the Japanese Embassy's "Grassroots" project 
contributed significantly to repairing school buildings in a considerable number of aimags and 
soums, which was appreciated by local citizens. The Grassroots project could create a belief 
among rural people, particularly at the level of general education school management that 
local level initiatives can directly turn into actions.  Before it was difficult to imagine that 
their initiated projects would be implemented, but now people of this sector have become 
fully confident to visit Japan Embassy and make their initiatives work. However, we should 
note here that the school directors who initiated and implemented the projects from the 
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beginning told us, "Local administration people and MPs elected from the region are very 
good at reflecting such projects in their report as if they brought the investment themselves".  
 
On the other hand, implementation of ADB program "Education sector development - I &II" 
was not always felt in rural areas and out of those felt ones, one or two training rooms 
established by the program investment were said to be poorly utilized and valued too high. 
After I interviewed about it much with 10th class students, I also had to make a conclusion 
that students' use of such equipped rooms was not satisfactory. But not every place had such a 
poor utilization record. For example, we should mention that computer training room of 
Temuujin school complex of Khentii aimag had a very good utilization.  
 
Soum schools lack professional teachers. Soum school teachers are not only professionally 
incompetent, but also lack will and aspiration to teach children.  
 
Generally, maintenance of school and dormitory buildings has been relatively improved in 
recent years as it was obvious in aimags and soums we visited.  But still  there are cases that 
the people who manage and work there lack will and initiative.  For example, 19 children 
were accommodated in a big room of school dormitory in Jargaltkhaan soum, Khentii aimag, 
but the room had only one 60 watt light-bulb which reduces children's ability to repeat their 
lessons. Here we do not need any ODA, rather we should and can do it ourselves. I hope now 
the situation of this dormitory got better, since it was planned to be repaired this summer by 
Sustainable livelihood project resources.     
 
Teachers and school officers were doubtful in their opinion on who are final beneficiaries of 
foreign aid.  
  
Similarly aimag internet network established by Soros Foundation operates properly in some 
aimags while it was closed in other aimags. For example, Dornod aimag administration has 
attached importance to internet and information and operated the internet network established 
by Soros Foundation properly.  By contrast, the Bayankhongor aimag administration closed 
its head computer, thereby making all network stations inoperable, because the administration 
believed the line rent were too costly. Even though all other network stations including 
schools paid their rents and expressed their ability to make payments, the aimag 
administration officials did not operate the network because of costs, which shows how they 
understand value of information in rural areas and attach radically different importances to it. 
Local administration staff do not always understand the necessity to attach importance to 
using information technology advantages in remotely located aimags in the current era of 
information.  
 
 
4.2.3 ODA effectiveneess in rural health 
 
As concluded in the book "Location map and financing of health sector aid-2002", current 
project implementation directions basically meet 13 government objectives for developing 
health sector in 2000-2004, which shows there is a certain coordination and consensus 
between donors and the government.    
 
In total, over 100 million USD of ODA projects have been implemented in the health sector 
and 60% of them, or over 62.0 million USD, of ODA projects and programs are now under 
implementation. Also 27% of these projects are financed by loans. The volume of ODA 
funding invested in this sector comprises 17% of total health sector expenditures; and 38.4% 
of total number of foreign aid projects and 48.5% of total project funding have been 
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implemented and disbursed by aimag and district level health organizations.  In total, 23 
projects and programs  funded by  16 donors have been implemented in  rural areas.  The 
table below shows what kind of projects and activities are implemented in aimags covered by 
the research.  
 
Table  5. Number of health sector aid projects implemented in aimags covered by the 
research - by directions 
  
Number of projects 
Project objectives and directions   
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1. Reproductive health/ Children and juvenile health  1 3  2 2 3 3 
2. Food and health  1 1  1 1 1  
3. Hygiene and food security    1     
4. Improvement in hospitall diognosis and treatment 
quality and supply of equipments and facilities 
2 1 2 3 3 2 2 
5. Collective participation 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
6. Disability and restorative treatment 1  1  1   
7. Other  1 1 1  1 1 1 
Source: "Location map and financing of health sector aid-2002" book  
 
As result of the ODA invested in the health sector, major indicators of the country's health 
status were drastically improved, including infant mortality rate which was reduced from 64 
per 1000 live births in 1991 to 29 in 2002, according to the implementation report of 
millennium development objectives, which is really appreciable. However, we have lost 
chances to achieve higher outcomes. If we take only one example of infant mortality rate, it 
was possible to be reduced as far more as illustrated by following chart.  
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Chart 10.  
INFANT MORTALITY PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS
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 Note: The chart illustrates estimation based on GDP of 1995 
 
The illustration shows that the health sector projects reached rural area in a fairly broad scale. 
But the my field research revealed that their utilizations were unsatisfactory indeed.                                   
 
So that I continued my field research in aimag clinical hospitals, regional diagnosis and 
treatment centers and family practice group to investigate why ODA outcomes are not 
satisfactory.  
 
Family practice groups established by Health sector development program-I investments now 
work in a way like former division clinics, not using project equipments and facilities 
properly. For example, common practices were observed, including they kept their computer 
unused for the fear of breaking or placed it at doctor's home; they couldn't operate advertising 
facilities properly or used some common facilities for the purpose of bulletin board for 
officers; couldn't repair ambulance vehicle -motorcycles for 7-8 months; and kept training 
room, special-purpose room and meeting rooms locked etc. Also very accurate and highly 
sophisticated diagnostic equipments were installed at aimag clinical hospitals, but they do not 
use them fully. For example, there is an expensive sophisticated microscopic apparatus 
"Fungus" designed for eyeball diagnosis at the Eastern region diagnostic center in Dornod 
aimag. But it was kept for several months unused and covered, since the trained specialized 
personnel who operates that device was on her maternity leave and later went for training in 
UB.  However, eye division of the center does not have an easy-to-use, simple, inexpensive 
and modern eye-pressure measuring apparatus "Tornometer", which is necessary for 
examining eyes of each visiting patients. "That shows, there is no priority list for utilizing 
ODA and no consultation with professional people," said Mrs. Michelle Potter, who works at 
the center as a consulting nurse from England. The situation was also observed at Khentii and 
Zavkhan clinical hospitals.  For instance, though there is a biochemical testing equipment 
with capacity of making over 30 types of diagnosis, they couldn't operate it and still use their 
old methods of diagnosis due to lack of competent professional operator and necessary 
reactive chemicals.  In most cases, the trained personnel were sick, moved or went for training 
or the equipment lack necessary materials and chemicals that are too expensive. Moreover, 
ODA equipment tends to be used for different purposes, including private uses or for common 
regular activities, which actually need simple or elementary instruments. 
 
Besides, numerious training and workshops are being held throughout health sector for the 
last 3-4 years, which even make some rural hospitals with few doctors unable to serve their 
patients. Training and workshops are organized at the hospital, aimag centers and in 
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Ulaanbaatar. Let's take only one example,  when we visited   3b,3c family practice groups 
located in the clinical hospital building of Selenge aimag center, there were no doctor to 
examine patients but only two nurses because three doctors were participating training and 
workshop: one in Ulaanbaatar, one at local administration office and another one at the 
clinical hospital. At the time, all doctors of aimag clinical hospital had gone to attend a 
workshop organized at the hospital at 11.00AM, so that patients came from rural soums and 
baghs were unable to receive a service. Local citizens I met evaluated that the service quality 
did not improve much though health sector receives large amount of ODA.  It was explained 
by seveal basic reasons, including: 
 
? They do not realize their main duty is to serve the people; 
? Poor management and organization, weak personnel structure and all the best doctors are 
in the management; thereby causes two consequences: first, to loose the best specialized 
doctors and second, to make management of the organization suffer due to unskilled 
managers; 
? Inadequate number and training of specialists to operate modern sophisticated equipments 
and instability of trained personnel; 
? Hospital working hours are too short, so that they do not serve everyone who wants to be 
diagnosed or treated; on the other hand, utilization rate is low for equipments;   
? Too many training and workshops are held, especially, it makes clinics with few doctors 
unable to serve patients; 
? Some people tend to make training and workshops as a source of income and attend them 
as much as possible even if they were non-relevant; 
? They do not select proper equipments to be received by ODA. Incoming equipments don't 
operate fully in their capacity, because someone supplies from the above or a politician 
brings to satisfy will of someone; 
? There is no system to monitor health organization activities in relation to their received 
amount of ODA; 
? Poor discipline of health organization officers, especially rural ones, due to too low 
standard of ethics; 
? ODA equipments and facilities are used for different purposes.  
  
People’s respond to the questions, "Is there any corruption? If yes, mainly where is it?" 
revealed that most corrupt areas are first, police, court and prosecutor's offices, and second, 
the health sector. This result shows that the foundation of our  health care system is 
completely defective.  
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Chart 11. 
 
 
 
It is obvious that any large amount of ODA can not bring a desired outcome in that situation.  
On the other hand, J. Surentsetseg concluded it in her article "Jobs and aid in Mongolia" that 
"As seen from the situation of 24 large projects implemented in the field of social security for 
the last 7 years, exactly where aid flows is very obscure", which also proves the fact.   
 
 
4.2.4 Other factors effecting poor ODA effectiveness in rural areas 
 
Another reason for ineffective utilization of ODA should be explained by poor management 
of public administration and public service organizations. By this research I felt that any large 
amount investments in hospitals, schools and public administration organizations can not 
bring desired outcomes when their management is poor.  
 
Highly specialized and skilled people mostly do technical works in foreign project and 
program implementation units because of their high level of salaries. For example, a 
specialized engineer works in a project unit as a driver or technical asistance officer. Such 
example is fairly common and brings two-sided consequenses. First, we're unable to take 
advantages of national specialists, and second, it tends to create a  whole sphere of society, 
specialized only by foreign aid projects and programs and isolated from livings of common 
people due to their high rate of salary. Such sphere of society is not only phenomenon in 
Mongolia, but also commonly observed in other countries that have too low level of avarege 
salary and receive large amouns of foreign aid.  This group of people are very sensitive to 
donors' project requirements and work toward fullfilling those requirements and participating 
proposed projects and programs, rather than feeling reality or landing on the ground of the 
country.    
 
In rural areas, main subjects that work on ODA implementation and play in a broad range 
decision making roles, including humanitarian aid and training, are soum and bagh governers. 
Whether aid products, goods, works, services and training  activities  go properly to their 
targeted beneficiaries depends fully on them.  That is,  how aid products find and reach the 
people or targeted group depend on sincerity level of bagh and khoroo governors. Half of the 
Is there any corruptions? Mainly where is it? 
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interview participants critisized that bagh governors did not distribute aid completely, though 
reported as if they distributed all and also they distributed to their close people and relatives. 
Rest of other interviewees answered, they did not know at all about the aid received and 
distributed. To take only one example: an agricultural company technician of Selenge aimag 
said that he heard personally that the bagh governor who gave 25 kg rice to an indigent 
household said them, "please say you received 50 kg".   
      
In other words, outcomes of small projects implemeted by soum, district, bagh, khoroos 
greatly depend on sincerity and principle of low and mid-level public administration officers 
and authorities. People I met told me, such public administration officers have a common 
dishonest and self-interested attitude.  Therefore, another independent study to determine 
spread of such situation would contribute greatly in refining monitoring and coordination 
mechanisms for further ODA utilization.  
     
Still exists common tendency that foreign consultants use much of foreign aid, and too 
expensive goods and equipments valued at high prices as well as almost outdated equipment 
and machineries are supplied in the forms of loan and aid. The general audit report conducted 
by the National Audit Office on 2003 activities of 13 UNDP-based projects mentioned that 
project fundings were made with many consecutive stages and 25.3-62.7% total project 
budgets were spent on salaries of foreign consultants. Therefore, we should involve 
Mongolian side actively in the selection of consultants  and hire foreign consultants only in 
case if Mongolians do not have such expertise.  Also we  should conduct selection of national 
consultants and officers, which tends to increase in recent years, in more realistic and fair 
ways and use expertise of competent national consultants extensively. Setting English 
proficiency as a main selection criterion is unreasonable, instead we should add weights to 
other selection requirements and involve specialized professional engineers and technicians 
accumulated relevant experiences and skills  as well as university professors and teachers.  
 
Utilization rate of project equipment and facilities has been reduced due to their inefficient 
utilization or "ownership" of one or several group of people.   
 
Besides, the research shows that donors are not so cooperative with each other and they do 
reflect own institutional ambition to their activities.   
 
Environmental impact assessments, which have to be done by a company instructed by the 
Ministry of Environment, are not performed properly.  Actually those companies do not 
perform proper assessment and they issue an assessment report just changing the name, 
address and location of previous reports as  I informed by local project implementation units.  
In other words, there are many companies that develop own businesses by foreign aid project 
contracts, but limit their work only by meeting formality requirements of project documents. 
As mentioned in the  above example, environmental impact assessments and environmental 
restoration assessments have to be done by a few companies. But they do not perform actual 
assessment, instead they just try to finance themselves from project resources by preparing 
assessment reports that meet formality requirements of donors.   
 
On-lending processes of ODA concessional loans are very slow and bureaucratic, which 
increases waiting costs of rural people and leads them to retreat from their initial enthusiaistic 
proposals and initiatives.  
 
Projects need to pay more attention on the use of locally available raw materials. Some 
projects, for instance "Complex basic social services" project supplies all goods and materials 
such as sand, wood and spike that are availably cheaply at local markets, from Ulaanbaatar, 
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wasting more money on transporation. Thereby, they reduce efficiency of aid resources and 
spend transportaion costs several times higher than their purchasing costs of goods.  
 
Well-trained professionals do not work well at aimag levels. Aimag and local administration 
officers, including all positions from guardmen to governor politicize too much.  That is, they 
prefer ruling party membership over competence. NGOs and foreign aid projects are less 
likely to achieve their objectives  unless they have contacts and cooperation with local 
administration, thereby increases transaction costs. For example, aimag education department 
officers and NGO offcers travel through soums with same purposes, but  separately by 
different vehicles wasting double costs.   
 
Also the teachers, who attended 1-2 day training of ADB "Education development 
programme" implemented by the MOECS,  were promoted more than those methodologist-
teachers, who completed 200-300 hours of programme training organized by Soros 
Foundation.  
 
In general, despite many training, workshops, study tours organized in the field of human 
resource development, significant amount of investment spent for this purpose and principal 
changes made in school and kindergarden syllabuses; it is too early to conclude that they 
brought substantial outcome in rural development.  
 
 
4.3 Conclusion  
  
As result of my research sought to answer the main research questions on how outcomes of 
concessional loans and aid contributed rural development and whether they were utilized 
effectively, I reached the following conclusion.  
 
Between 1991-2002,  donors contributed  over 1000.0 USD of grant aid and loans to each 
Mongolian citizen and this amount of ODA per capita made Mongolia one of five countries 
most dependent on foreign aid.  
 
Due to poor economic policies and relevant institutional structure and mechanism to 
implement these policies as well as poor law enforcement, our GDP per capita is 4-10 times 
lower, investment rate is 9 times lower and infant mortality rate is 3 more times higher than 
their estimated achievable levels. In other words,  actual outcome of ODA is too low or at the 
level basically not felt in rural areas.  I would like to conclude that this low level of ODA 
effectiveness is caused by following factors. 
 
? State service is very cumbersome. There are too many administration offices in an aimag 
center, including aimag governor's office, soum governor's office, taxation service, health 
office, education and culture office, professional inspection office, court and police etc, 
which are oversized in comparison to the local population. Rather than encouraging 
enterprises from the start of its business, too many inspections and controls are imposed 
actively, which lead people to extinguish their initiatives to run a production. 
 
? Public service human resource management is poor. Quality and performance of public 
service are not so good, which is related to incompetence and lack of working attitude of 
recruited personnel and poor time management of public organizations. Also due to too 
low level of salary in public sector, good professional officers prefer professional or non-
professional  jobs at ODA project implementing units or promotion to higher managament 
positions when political environment is favorable. Then it leads to two consequences both 
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to loose to loose a skilled specialist and to make management of the organization worse 
due to unskilled managers. Morover, in an aimag centers, competent personnel trained by 
series of ODA training for several years mostly work as project coordinator, secretary and 
translator while highly specialized young engineers work as project office driver and 
assistant officer.  Thereby it distorts efficiency of human resource capacity and harms 
socioeconomic development of the country as well as creates so-called "project" group of 
people who have relatively high level of salary and isolated from the reality of life. 
Selection of foreign aid project officers only on the basis of their English proficiency and 
in accordance with donor's documentation requirement has become main cause of this 
improper practice. Also people, not relevant to the project objectives, or senior officers go 
abroad for project training and studies on reward-based procedures, so that they do not 
make any contribution to increase project effectiveness when they return.  
 
? Public administration officers of aimag local administration organizations politisize too 
much and discourage entiusiasm of professional people; they are very cautious in taking 
initiatives of a work; they like to own information and make their positions valuable; and 
disregard their duties to serve the people; therefore they create bureacracy at each level of 
administration, which also adversely affect on implementation and outcomes of foreign 
aid. 
 
? Public administration and public service organizations have become accustomed to 
foreign aid, reacting in a way that it comes as usual and they - the public administration 
officers- have to use and spend it. In other words, they do not have a way of thinking, that 
the benefits of foreign aid should be delivered to the people through their services. 
Sufficient number of training was held for social sector workers in rural areas, but their 
outcomes are not so good due to poor human resource policy.  A group of people, almost 
specialized by being a trainees, has been created.  
 
? Due to inadequate budget support and fiscal understatements, buildings and constructions 
built by project resources lack routine repairs and maintenance, therefore subject to early 
defects and damages; which is another reason for low efficiency rate of ODA project 
investments and low utilization rate of supplied equipments and technologies.  
 
? Rural community is in lack of information. Information accessibility is limited in rural 
areas, except for brief news on contract signing and tape-cutting ceremonies appear on TV 
or daily newspapers. Local people suppose foreign aid as a sack of flour or rice. Local 
people know very few or about 20 percent of all implemented and implementing projects, 
which proves information inaccessibility in rural areas.   
 
? It is not secret that corruption and conspiracy is popular at mid- and low levels of 
administration. Ministry, district, soum, khoroo officials take use of ODA projects and 
programs through their relatives and close partners. For example, by not delivering 
humanitarian aid completely to those necessary, helping in winning competitive tenders, 
receiving certain percent of bonus in return, co-benefiting from contracts, or asking for 
assistance on other matters from the winner of tender etc. 
 
? Because we do not think about how to continue a project further before implementing the 
project, project activities basically end with its completion. No organizational structure and 
pesonnel policy has been created to continue project  operation, everything ends upon 
project completion just leaving  loan repayment amounts on the state budget and job 
history records on curriculum vitae of a few project officers.  
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? ODA did not reach private sector, especially rural businessmen. Though one or two small 
amount of short-term loans with high interest rate was granted, the granting procedure 
itself is very cumbersome and its decision making is very time-consuming and 
bureaucratic, which increases waiting costs for rural people and tires them.   
 
? Projects directly managed by donors through their project implementation units reach their 
targets more. That is, projects implemented through public administration organizations 
achieve poor results since they do not always reach their targets fully. 
 
? ODA mostly focused on rural infrastructure and social sectors, but outcomes are 
unsatisfactory, especially in social sectors. 
 
? There must be priority list for selecting equipments and goods supplied by ODA. As result 
of receiving highly sophisticated, high-capacity, expensive equipment and apparatus that 
need specialized personnel currently not available in Mongolia, rather than simple, easy-to 
use instruments; large amount of assets are being held in storage due to their inefficient 
uses. Projects need to reflect the aspect of preparation and training for specialised operators 
before receiving such high-capacity equipments. 
 
? Young graduates aspire to move into cities due to unfavorable living and working 
conditions caused by insufficient supply of heating, hot water and apartment houses  in 
aimag centers.  
 
? Significant amount of ODA is costs for foreign consultants. 
 
? Products and services supplied by ODA cost too high. 
 
? Competitive tenders for selecting ODA project contractors and suppliers of ODA goods 
and products are not always conducted  in fair and appropriate ways. 
 
? Information on ODA implementation, utilization and outcomes are inadequate nationwide. 
Such information is exchanged only between few government officers and donors at 
official level. 
 
? Foreign aid and assistances utilized by public sector can not be effective in the current 
situation, where corruption took place widely with respect to the  too low level of salary of 
the people, especially of those work in public sector; where working attitude and 
approaches of public sector officers remain unchanged; where exists a system that enables 
to politicize every issue and disregard duties to serve the people, but try to increase values 
of their own position. Public sector is likely to attract large amount of investment in case if 
people's mindset, attitude and approaches are changed, if politicization is reduced, and if 
public sector salary level is increased at least 3-4   times from its current level to the level 
of project workers. Utilizing more foreign aid directly for the development of rural private 
sector would be more effective for the current situation.  
 
 
FIVE. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON  
IMPROVING ODA EFFECTIVENESS 
 
In order to achieve the main goal to find ways of improving foreign aid effectiveness in rural 
development, I explored how did we use ODA to date, what outcomes did we achieve, what 
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were the main factors, as described in the above chapters. On the basis of my research 
findings I propose following recommendations.  
 
 
I. In the framework of policy regulation, we need:  
 
1. To draft and approve long and mid-term strategic plans to receive ODA and to reflect my 
comments and recommendations proposed by this research work. 
A. In setting directions for utilizing ODA in rural areas: 
? The first priority must be establishment of energy sources in aimag centers.  But here we 
should address issues of aimags. That is, first we need to unite aimags with very close 
centers and then disburse ODA in providing reliable sources of energy for these centers. At 
first order, we need to involve private sector producers of renewable energy sources into 
ODA projects and disburse necessary budget expenditures.  
?  To disburse ODÀ in urban development, especially in constructing housing complexes 
with hot and cold water and in expanding and renewing city sewerage networks.  
? To use long-term, low interest rate ODA loans for housing needs of aimag and local 
youths. To expand ADB housing loans into more cities and consider side effects that 
transaction costs of such loans may increase due to  ineffective complex structure created if 
the loan documentation procedures are too cumbersome and request terms and conditions 
rural  citizens can never achieve; 
? To provide concessional loan sources for rural private businesses that process natural and 
livestock-origin raw materials and run agricultural production; and to develop small and 
medium enterprises in aimag centers at first order; 
? To disburse ODA in establishing performance-based chain system that linked herdsmen, 
veterinary service and products aimed at developing veterinary sector and improving 
livestock health and breeding; which would be an export promotion measure;    
? To involve wider range of private organizations operating in rural social sectors, such as 
private clinics, schools and training centers, in ODA projects and activities;  
? To implement advertising campaign and public awareness training measures aimed at 
improving ethics and mindset of public administration, public service and special service 
officers and reducing their inefficiency, bureacracy and corrupt practices; and to involve 
local NGOs in this campaign; 
 
? To conduct systematic training on public sector human resource policy; to close all 
options that link job duties of public administration and public sector officers with their 
political views and eliminate the practice that employ own relatives. For this purpose, we 
need to establish open information system officially in all aimags and secure equal access 
for all aimag and local citizens. 
 
B. In taking stance to reduce portion of loans in total ODA down to 35-30% and to increase 
portion of grant aid up to 65-70%, to make it close to the standards of other developing 
countries: 
 
? To stop receiving economically inefficient, but socially effective loans in the near future; 
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? To use only grant aid but not loans in rural social sectors; 
 
? To suspend temporarily the ODA disbursement on further construction of roads unless 
repair and maintenance budgets of previously constructed roads are  reflected adequately in 
fiscal calculations; 
? To establish a "head" institute for policy analyses and evaluation and utilize ODA only for 
efficient projects approved by the institute; 
 
? To organize broad public discussion on large ODA projects involving professional 
organizations, research institutes and users and to enable opportunity for the people to 
express their opinion, before making decision to receive assistance; 
 
C. To separate functions of economic development policy from MOFE and establishing 
'head' institute of development policy  
 
? The institute shall have a non-political structure comprised of competent leading 
economists and shall be responsible for conducting economic analyses on further ODA 
directions and loan projects and consulting the Cabinet; 
 
D. To restructure the FACC maintaining balance of representation from NGOs, research 
institutes, businesses and citizens, so that they can: 
? have discussion and consultation on new project proposals; 
? discuss performance of previously implemented projects; 
? issue press reports on results of discussions; 
 
2. To draft and approve urgently the procedures and rules on implementing the Law on 
foreign aid regulations, including: 
 
- Procedure on registering foreign aid granted in the form of goods and products 
- Procedure on domestic on-lending of foreign aid resources and its contract 
form 
- Procedure on project implementation report 
- Medium-term program on receiving foreign aid 
- Procedure and guideline on requesting necessary documents and materials 
from relevant bodies 
- Procedure on reporting storage, protection, usage and expenditure of foreign 
aid resources 
- Procedure on creation and use of foreign aid records and information database 
 
? To concentrate the donor-to-donor coordination into hands of Mongolian government and 
identify their documentation requirements and reporting systems with each other; 
 
 
II.  In the framework of implementation regulation 
 
1. To ensure conditions to involve loan users actively in the project drafting stages, including: 
 
? Economic efficiency calculation; 
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? Economic analyses; 
 
? Implementation forms; 
 
? Repayment schedule; thereby makes project assumptions close to reality and makes 
efficiency calculations reasonable. 
 
2. To establish criteria for measuring ODA project implementation and performance 
outcomes and to make them bases for decision making to receive assistance. 
 
3. In making on-lending contracts with ODA loan users, government shall take equal 
responsibility with the users in terms of government duties with regard to the loan. 
 
4. To eliminate donors' and political influence on ODA project implementation and decision-
making: 
 
4.1 To ensure equal representation of government bodies, NGOs and private sector 
organizations in the composition of ODA project management committees; 
 
4.2 To restrict political influence on all kinds of competitive tenders; 
4.2.1  To ensure fair and transparent conduct of competitive tendering for  for 
the supply of ODA project goods and services, excluding ministers, deputy 
directors, department heads and officers of ministries and administration 
departments from the composition of tendering committees and instead, 
involving professional people from aid beneficiaries or receiving organizations 
as well as  broad representation from of local citizens (here I did not refer to 
representatives of citizens' assembly).  
 
4.3 To stop the practice that politicians use equipments, constuctions, goods and 
services supplied by projects for the purpose of advertising campaign to strengthen 
their political position; 
 
5. To make implementation reports identical for all donors and Government of Mongolia; 
 
6. As for the supply, Mongolian side needs to develop common criteria and requirements for 
foreign aid goods and products at the very beginning and to follow them at all level. 
Especially, there must be high level of quality and consumption requirements. For example, 
they: 
 
6.1 shall be under production in the near future; 
6.2 shall be easy-to-use; 
6.3 shall be priced not higher than market rate;  
6.4 spare parts and supporting materials shall be easily available; 
6.5 shall have low utilization costs; 
 
In other words, the above procedures shall reflect terms that selection of machineries and 
equipment must regard their technical capacity to match desired operational capacity, 
operation complexity and procurement of spare parts or materials. 
 
 
7. To make personnel training and stability guaranteed: 
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7.1 To prepare at least three specialized operators for highly sophisticated equipments 
and to set up a promotion system in correlation between working hours and utilization 
rate of supplied equipments;  
 
7.2 To set salaries of trained operators minimally at the level of project officers; 
 
7.3 To involve staff with stable employment in training and study tours of ODA 
technical assistance; 
 
8. To set cost ceiling on foreign consultants on the basis of special survey. 
9. To establish information system that covers all stages of foreign aid proposal, discussion, 
utilization and evaluation;  
9.1. To create an integrated ODA information database that automatically registers all 
projects; 
9.1.1 To provide certain discount and incentive for projects and measures 
registered to the information database; 
9.1.2 To do regular adjustment with donors' information, which will be of 
benefit to both sides; 
9.2 To provide systematic information on project implementation and follow-up 
utilization: 
9.2.1 To publish a series of information bulletin "Foreign assistance in 
Mongolia"; 
9.2.2 To report on media expected outcomes of a project before its start and 
actual performance outcomes after completion of the project; 
9.2.3 To create information system, where receives public opinion and 
information on project implementation and utilization and provides such 
information to others; 
9.2.4 To provide information on project continuance, utilization and 
effectiveness by intervals of one, three and five years after the end of project. 
III. In the framework of outcome, continuance and monitoring: 
1.  To report amount of assistance directly goes to beneficiaries on public media, which can 
become a self-controlling mechanism; 
2. To establish performance criteria during project drafting phase and include them in the list 
of criteria for project approval;  
? To define socio-economic criteria for loan projects and make them transparent for all 
organizations and individuals involved in initiating loan projects; No project fallen 
behind the criteria shall go upper level organizations. 
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? To consider continuity of a project before its start of implementation; and for some 
projects necessary to run continuously with stable structure and staff left, such 
conditions of continuity need to be included in the list of project approval requirements;  
3. To make all criteria transparent to public; 
4. Monitoring and evaluation divisions of ministries need to monitor performance and 
outcomes of ODA project implementation and utilization; 
5. To allow  NGOs and private sector organizations to evaluate follow-up project utilization 
and publicize their reports on public media.    
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SIX. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Local survey participants 
(by production, service and business types) 
 
Organizations  
U
H 
B
H 
K
E SE
D
T 
K
O ZA 
Tota
l  
Aimag administration officers  4 2 2 8 3 3   6 28
Soum administration officers  9   1 13   2     25
Bagh administration officers          1      1
Aimag public organization officers (excluding 
health and education organizations)  2 5 4 7 4 4   3 29
Health sector officers      5 10 6 5   6 32
Education sector officers 2 19 7 3 15 4   2 52
Private businessmen  4 10 5 9 6 5   8 47
Banking sector officers  3 1   1 1 2    8
Foreign aid project officers  5 4 4 20 3 3   6 45
Herdsmen 5   7   1      13
Agricultural sector workers      1 2   5    8
Mining and power station workers   2 1   1    4
Retailers 6 18 12 14 12 21    3 86
Road and construction workers      2        2
Patients       11 1 5           17
NGO officers 1 1 1 1 3 3   10
Total 41 62 52 99 57 62 34 407
 
Appendix 2 
Business entities registered to aimag tax offices 
           
    1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Uvurhangai Total     493 404 329 303 316 330   
LLC     129 128 130 130 138 166   
Cooperative     98 39 37 40 45 79   
 Private 
business 
entity     194 167 86 62 56 0   
Dornod Total     210 244 277 277 340 430 447 
LLC 12 50     100     132   
Bayanhongor Cooperative 45 125     74     144   
Total           256 308 395   
LLC           127 166 220   
Khentii Cooperative           36 41 63   
Total         797 915 1076 1259   
LLC       399 445 505 589 673   
Selenge Cooperative       43 47 38 59 81   
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Appendix 3.  
 
Sectoral allocation of ODA disbursed between 1991-2002  
 
Sector Total Loan Grant aid 
Agriculture 154.4 38.99 115.4
Construction 29.97 - 29.97
Energy 253.41 130.52 122.90
Environment  43.54 - 43.54
Financial sector 85.67 72.41 13.26
Government reform  40.89 24.43 16.46
Health 91.31 14.07 77.24
Human resource development 234.67 14.32 220.35
Industry 195.71 142.14 53.57
Macroeconomic restructuring 188.19 90.28 97.91
Minerals 10.88 - 10.88
Other 166.51 148.92 17.59
Social welfare 48.55 17.85 30.70
Special aid 368.21 162.44 205.77
Communication 116.00 66.99 49.01
Trade 3.22 - 3.22
Transportation 404.89 311.54 93.35
Public utility 41.95 20.14 21.81
Total 2476.99 1255.04 1222.9 
Source : Ministry of Finance and Economy, Mongolia ‘Effectiveness and Contributions of ODA for Mongolia’. 
Mongolia Consultative Group Meeting 19-21 November, 2003. Tokyo. Japan. 
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Appendix 4 
 
List of foreign aid projects implementing in Selenge aimag (over 40) and other implemented measures 
    
Donor Project implementors Name of project Project term, objectives and activities 
Grassroots   
Contributed to the resolution of financial matters for the maintenance of schools and kindergartens of Sukhbaatar, Hutul 
and Shaamar soums. Repaired building roof of Secondary school No. 1, Sukhbaatar soum (68 million MNT) and 
provided houses for 5 households of 5 baghs of the soum. Granted x-ray apparatus of 76 thousand USD, electricity 
generator for 500 households and computer facilities of 2.5 million MNT to Hutul soum. 
  КР-2 Grain renewal measure covered 35 entities of 8 soums. Equipment renewal of 200 million MNT was done in Hutul. 
Ecology fund Aid 
Covered 30 children, 26 households in Altanbulag soum. Reforested 8 hа of area in 2003, 8 ha of area in 2004, and 
organized training for students. Forestation continues in Altanbulag soum of Selenge aimag.  
North East Asian 
Forest Forum and 
Japan  
Rehabilitation of Tuj 
pine forest Granted aid necessary for foresting over 400 ha of area 
Improvement of 
population 
immunization 
coverage  
Aimed to improve population immunization and supply reliable vaccines in Khushaat. Project term is 10 years. Supplied 
one motorcycle of 1799,8 thousand MNT, one electricity generator of 462,0 thousand MNT, a Vaccine refrigerator of 
250,0 thousand MNT. Trained one doctor, vaccinator and 3 assistant doctors in Bayangol soum. Granted a motorcycle 
of 1702,8 thousand MNT. Reduced children's illness by 1.8% and incidence of infectious diseases with vaccines by 
60%.  
  Implements many projects for reducing children's illness and incidence of infectious diseases with vaccines. 
J
a
p
a
n
 
JICA   Made research since 1994 on what sectors need what kind of aid. 
Renovation of 
training methods Project covered Hutul town. 
U
S
A
 
  
  Farmer to farmer Covered 8 business entities of 3 soums in agricultural sector (Hutul) 
U
N
,
 
M
O
F
A
 
UN – MOFA 
Sustainable 
grassland 
management 
Project duration 2003-2007. Covers 102 people, 52 households and 5 groups of herdsmen in Bayangol soum. 
Organizes training. Employed full-time local project officer and provided a set of computer, printer, desk and chair, JPS 
for pastureland measurement. The project covered over 200 people in Bayangol soum and established 4 cooperatives 
and 1 group. 
Orkhon project   
Children and family 
project 
Implementation started in 1999 and went to 2nd stage in 2004; the project cooperates with Bagahangai and Nalaikh 
districts of Ulaanbaatar city. The project aims mainly at improving social security and protecting rights of children living 
in difficulties by taking a complex, step-by-step measures to support families of selected districts that live below living 
standard. It covered Khuder soum. 
  
Starts free-of-charge professional courses for home appliance repairman, construction pipeline repairman, electrical 
welder, salesmen, treasurer and barmen. Many people have been registered. 
N
o
r
w
a
y
 
Norway international 
charity organization 
  Conducted activities to reduce unemployment in Altanbulag soum and covered 1000,9 people. 
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Health development 
program 
Project duration 1998-2008. Aims to train health sector officer and doctors in Selenge aimag, implement Complex 
management of Children's Management program for children and reduce infant mortality. By now, it has trained 62 
college-degree doctors, financed IDM program for children, involved 60 children in summer nursing camp, established 
training and information center and spent in total 350,000 USD with annual disbursement of 50,000 USD to certain 
objects, including Egneshgui household clinics, physical treatment room in Orkhon tuul, micro-laboratory in Hutul, 
training and information center in Nomgon and Mandal, physical treatment facilities in Baruunkharaa, steam heating in 
Orkhon etc. Granted 362.8 thousand MNT to Khushaat soum for training 3 persons for 9 months in three years. In 
2003, there was no mortality of children aged 0-5 in Bayangol soum and 7 doctors were trained in 2 training. Covered 
also Khuder soum. 
The project has been implemented since 1995. It focuses on protecting Mongolian thin-wool sheep-breed in livestock 
sector. Here it cooperates with Livestock Scientific Research Institute. One of the main project successes was a pilot 
farm established in Khongor soum. They aim to secure constant growths in number of Mongolian thin-wool sheep with 
the help of this farm and local herdsmen.  Its wool processing center uses thin sheep wools in its processing. Poverty 
Reduction Fund organized training on wool and gave a wool-processing machine to Sukhbaatar soum (801 USD and 2 
engines). The project also covered Hutul town. School teaches how to make wool products in Bayangol soum. 3 groups 
of vegetable growers have been created. The project also covered Khuder soum. 
  
Selenge 
development project 
 The project allocates loans over 2 million MNT every year to Orkhon, Saikhan, Shaamar, Sukhbaatar and Javhlant 
soums to improve living standard of household vegetable growers and support irrigated cultivation and organizes 
regular training 1-2 times a year involving over 300 vegetable growers. (Orkhontuul soum) Distributed 150 kg of 
vegetable and flower seeds to 350 people and 135 kg of seeds to 270 people in Sukhbaatar soum. Granted loans of 
500 thousand MNT every year in Bayangol soum and distributed necessary amount of new sort seeds. Organized each 
year 1-2 training and involved over 100 vegetable growers. According to requests of some people, built small sized of 
heating boiler in Altanbulag and Dulaankhaan and solar energy hot water showers in 6 soums. Holds 2-day project 
planning local workshop to define needs. The project also covered Hutul town and Khuder soum. 
Environmental 
protection, 
sustainable 
management of 
natural resources 
It has 5 objectives. 1. Forestation with sustainable management 2. Joint possession forestry 3. Sustainable 
management of tourism 3. Sustainable management of hunting 4. Natural adaptation and balance 5. Management of 
Khan Khentii special protected area 
Local human 
resource capacity 
building project Held a workshop for three days 
Forest road 
The project will construct minor roads linked soum centers to central roads. Drafted a project based on forest census 
research. According to request for concessional loans, the project is going to be implemented in Selenge and Zavkhan 
aimags. Now the project is at the MOFE. Forest census will be conducted in Tsagaannuur and Eruu soums. 
  
Granted financial aid and sent professional expert to organize the fighting against infectious insects and diseases and 
hunting management in Selenge aimag.  
FRG  GTCS 
Mother-friendly 
clinics  Implementation continues in 3 soums 
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Reproductive health 
sector support project 
Project duration 1998-2006. The project aims to improve family planning, pregnancy protection and disease prevention 
among pregnant women and birth age population and to reduce maternal mortality. During these periods, the project 
invested 200 million MNT, implemented projects in 11 soums involving 40 thousand people and achieved no maternal 
mortality record in 2003. Established mothers' rest rooms, solar energy hot showers, fully equipped training rooms and 
small steam boilers in soums, and reproductive health complex in aimag clinical hospital; and organized multiple 
training for professionals. Established hospitals in Tsagaannuur and Altanbulag soums. The project operates also in 
Bayangol soum. Performed interior design and furnishing of mothers' rest rooms in 8 soums and 3 villages. Invested in 
total 107 million MNT into health sector of Hutul town, including mothers' rest rooms, fully equipped training exercise 
room for elders, echo-diagnosis apparatus, fully equipped dental clinic room (9.2 million in 2004), vehicles for bagh 
doctors etc. Project implementation is doing well in Bayangol soum and all women got good awareness of reproductive 
health. Also, informal education project of World Vision organized distance education and established training centers 
in the soum and made 18 adults and 56 children literate. 
  
Household 
agriculture Involved 57 citizens of 3 soums. 
France 
Sante-Su 
humanitarian 
organization 
Santis project: Soum 
clinical aid quality 
improvement project 
Project duration 2003-2006. Project aims to develop soum hospitals and involved all total number of 135 soum doctors 
to a 160-hour training on health first aid and service since 2003. This year it will equip every soum with a computer and 
spend a budget of 60 million MNT. Trainers will visit every soum 7 times and take measures to implement hospital 
projects and organize supplementary training. Established hospitals in Tsagaannuur and Khushaat soums. Granted aid 
to 4500 people and 10 households in Altanbulag soum. 8 doctors attended training in Bayangol soum, their service 
quality has been increased. Granted solar energy hot water shower to Bayangol soum. Implements project in Khuder 
soum. 
Netherlands Khadag society   
Aims to create jobs, reduce poverty, develop agricultural business and supply medical equipments. Granted dental 
equipment. 
UK 
Save the Children 
UK   
Established "Unur bul" center to create favorable living environment for 25 dispossessed children and help them study 
and live normally. The center now normally operates receiving financial support from local budget in recent four years.  
Switzerland 
JCS development 
cooperation agency 
Reduction of natural 
disasters 
Implementation lasted one year in 2003. Granted food aid to households suffered by dzud, including 2500 kg rice of 
950000 MNT, 7000 kg flour of 2100000 MNT to 100 households, home medical package of 15.0-1500000 MNT to 100 
households, and 10 tones potato of 3500000 MNT to 120 households for cultivation, which produced 53.6 tones of 
potato for food needs. Also distributed 3600000 MNT of meats to 100 households and involved in total 280 households. 
Granted aid of 10037.0 thousand MNT to 90 households and 270 citizens in Orkhon soum between April 20, 2003 and 
October 07, 2003 and improved household livelihoods. Granted 10 ger houses for homeless people in Sukhbaatar 
soum. 
    Completely resolved kindergarten house problems in Javhlant, Sukhbaatar and Mandal soums. 
UNDP   
Pastureland 
management 
improvement project 
Implementation started in Byangol and Mandal soums since 2003. Created 15 groups of herdsmen in those soums and 
trained local coordinators creating their working environment in order to improve lives of herdsmen by correlating 
livestock pastureland management with climate changes. 
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Soros 
Foundation     
Made intellectual and material investment for education reform and disbursed 35.5 million MNT covering total 7 schools 
of 6 soums and organized training involving 19 national trainers and over 400 teachers. 5 children with highest 
achievements entered universities with supports from Soros Foundation. The Foundation helped actively in improving 
computer procurement of soum schools, increasing effectiveness of distance education, expanding pre-school 
education, establishing mobile library to serve school children, providing service vehicles etc., by the above amount of 
investments. Granted a copy machine of 250,0 thousand MNT, books of 32,0 thousand MNT to Khushaat soum and 12 
training computers to school No. 4 of Sukhbaatar soum.  
    
Granted 1750.0 of aid to 100 households and 296 citizens to help single-headed or indigent families below living 
standard in Orkhon soum between 2004.1.10-2004.2.1 and granted 5 tones of rice to 100 indigent households 5 baghs 
in Sukhbaatar soum.  
  Food security 
Granted food aid to households suffered with snowfall and dzud for a month since June 20, 2004, including 5 tones of 
rice to 100 households and 694 people. 
  Informal education 
Gave basic education to 12 children out of 25 children involved as result of activities to educate and socialize children 
dropped out of school in Bayangol soum. Involved 50 children of Mandal soum (implements 14 project). Stopped 
practice of children that wander in trains, established soum development fund and will continue its operation for 15 
years.  
World  Vision     
In cooperation with aimag Governor's Office organized measures to distribute total 90 tones of food aid to over 1900 
herder families of 16 soums of the aimag, which suffered in the winter 2003-2004. 
WHO Global Fund   
The project will implement in Bayangol soum between 2003-2005 for the purpose to let prostitutes use condoms 100%. 
In this framework, trained one specialist in a 2-day training. 
  
Health sector 
development 
program I, II Supplied medical instruments to Hutul town of Saikhan soum.  
  
Education sector 
development 
program I, II 
Granted a training room to School No. 1 of Sukhbaatar soum and classrooms of chemistry, physics and biology and 
information equipments to the school of Hutul town.  
ADB   
Rural development 
project 
Loan projects for agricultural production have been implemented through aimag commercial banks involving rural 
residents of herdsmen and agricultural workers. The project involved total 300 business entities and citizens in 2003. 
Luxemburg   МОN-002 
Starts linking aimag clinical hospital echo-diagnostic equipments to Hospital No. 3 in Ulaanbaatar city through 
telecommunication. Trained 2 aimag doctors in a course for three months. 
UNESCO   Let's live learning 
Organized activities to teach professional skills to the population and make them literate and involved over 200 
households. The training involved 40 people in Hutul city.  
World bank   ТА 
Implemented in Altanbulag soum for 3 months. Repaired school and kindergarten buildings, heating system and 
pipelines for 6500,0, involved 27 people. Built new fresh water system of Bagh No. 1 and school steam boiler of Bagh 
No. 5 in Sukhbaatar soum (fresh water-6500, 0, steam boiler-1600, 0). 
АDRA     Distributed Kinova food rice to 223 workers of 4 organizations in Sukhbaatar soum from poverty reduction fund.  
Inner Mongolia   Investment Established dry-cleaning service in Sukhbaatar soum with investment of 10 million MNT and created 2 jobs. 
Fu-Hua LLC   Investment Established wood carving enterprise in Sukhbaatar soum with investment of 50 million MNT and created 20 jobs. 
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  Grant aid Donated 3 million MNT for the central garden in Sukhbaatar soum. 
PR China   Investment Established wood stick factory in Sukhbaatar soum with investment of 100 million USD and created 120 jobs. 
APEC   
Increasing public 
awareness and 
releasing children 
from heavy labor 
Project duration 2003.9.26-2005.2.26, Involves 64 children of 32 households in Bayangol soum. Organized training two 
times. Brought whole project team to Ulaanbaatar and trained them for three days. 
UN Children's 
Fund   
Collective health 
project 
Project aims to improve supply of medicines and medical products and create regular source of assets for drug stores. 
Project continued between 1996 and May 2003 and supplied total 3.7 million MNT of medicines and medical materials. 
Now drug stores finance themselves from own resources. 
Agriculture Establishes irrigation system in Bayangol soum. 
European 
Union TACIS 
Agriculture, livestock 
breeding 
Nomun Khan LLC was involved in an agricultural project. It receives 25% of fertilizers free of charge and purchases 
other 75%. 
Korea   Food program Distributed cash on the site during 2003 fire. 
Peace corpus     6 American came to Hutul and organized training. 
      Implemented a project to increase public awareness of mercury poisoning. 
DANIDA       
    
This is the list of projects mentioned at the consultative meeting of coordinators of foreign aid projects implemented in Selenge aimag. Ìºíãºí óñ 
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                                                                                                                                                                                        Appendix 5. 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Aimags 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Bayanhongor aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 83.2 85.2 87.3 89.6 91.1 85.3 85.7 84.4
Number of herder households Number 12212 12470 13938 14090 14186 14246 13698 11643
Number of poor population Person 26826 26816 33738 31342         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2227 3370 3112 2395 2036 2000 1833 2465
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 59 42 52 31 45 38 33 44
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2227.1 2233.1 2428 2511.3 2475.1 1522.8 1581.7 862.2
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 78.8 89.7 85 183.2 194.5 167.8 141.9 272
Local budget income Million MNT 506.6 538.3 638.8 809.6 689.5 788.4 1767.7 2047.1
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1779.7 2181.5 2474 3493.5 3411 4558.9 5247.9 5187.4
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Khentii aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 73.8 73.9 73.7 72.9 70.9 71.4 71.9 72
Number of herder households Number 7552 7269 7095 7794 7798 7722 8016 7378
Number of poor population Person 10193 12216 22308 17466         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 1735 1953 2005 1686 1538 1864 1496 996
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 36 40 43 33 25 45 33 41
Number of livestock Thousand heads 1100.9 1150.5 1254 1388.7 1462.3 1471.4 1356.7 1378.5
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 7537.7 12250.1 13645.9 14815.9 13334.7 9708.5 7939.2 14227.9
Local budget income Million MNT 618.9 780 889.2 870.1 936.9 1044.4 1494.8 2215.1
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1792.1 2272.6 2718.8 2994.9 3485.8 4624.5 5336.4 5312.2
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Main socioeconomic indicators of Khovd aimag 
          
  Measurement unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 86.3 87 87.7 87.4 86.8 87.8 88.7 88.5
Number of herder households Number 9572 9528 10202 10313 10368 10670 10470 9137
Number of poor population Person 18342 23122 25579 39705         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 1863 2065 1977 1921 1890 1880 1389 1029
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 43 47 33 39 38 36 35 35
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2070.6 1954.9 1926.5 1795.9 1867.9 1836.3 1512.7 1323.9
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 1641.7 2342.7 2344.6 2940 2978.5 2690.8 2648.2 2958.2
Local budget income Million MNT 392 455.8 601.6 775.1 810.1 819.1 1272.4 2245.3
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 10789.9 2119.5 2523 3022.3 3388.8 4343.4 5245.7 5532.6
 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Selenge aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 96.4 97.3 98.1 99.2 100 100.9 101.7 102.2 
Number of herder households Number 2254 2471 2312 2719 2189 2803 2762 3244 
Number of poor population Person 11385 12678 8865 16682         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2134 2714 3267 1732 1320 1508 1129 822 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 37 36 25 25 35 18 19 30 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 504.7 506.6 522.5 569.4 622.6 654.5 645.4 683.4 
Cultivated  agricultural area Ha 130103.6 123966.7 120790.5 140145 130391.6 93656.4 100648.6 125092.1 
Local budget income Million MNT 2503.1 3308.2 4753.5 5344.8 5020.2 4194.9 4623.7 3966.3 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 2899.6 3822.5 4983.8 5827.1 5853.4 6947.1 7041 8107.3 
 
 52
 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Uvurhangai aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 109.5 110.5 111.5 112 111.4 113 114 113.9
Number of herder households Number 17197 17687 19845 18723 19787 19653 18721 17814
Number of poor population Person 27324 34970 44347 36457         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2588 3264 2286 2906 2435 2469 2420 2137
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 35 50 35 37 32 29 20 32
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2595 2550.1 2718.2 2921.5 2956.6 2159 1869.1 1665.4 
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 13661 10842.1 9935.3 3629.2 1769.7 2935.4 2772.8 3512.2
Local budget income Million MNT 892.2 1375.5 1735.2 1465.9 1450.8 1279.2 1893.2 3119.7
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1855 2554 3559.5 3639.5 4415.9 4721.1 5481.5 6161.1
 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Dornod aimag 
          
  Measurement unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 77.8 78 77.5 76.7 75.3 74.2 74.5 74.7
Number of herder households Number 3783 3728 4483 4175 4514 4908 4959 4683
Number of poor population Person 19286 21927 25980 18978         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 5253 5982 6220 4216 2177 2397 2272 1321
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 68 51 60 39 42 43 41 41
Number of livestock Thousand heads 591.4 594.2 657.2 735.7 811.8 826.2 794.1 825.4
Cultivated  agricultural area Ha 8737 11587.6 14605.4 8162.3 6811.5 5144.2 5338.8 6181.5
Local budget income Million MNT 804.9 795.3 1157.1 1023.8 908.9 983.5 1579.6 2152.8
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1579.5 1862.7 2765.2 2996.6 3314.6 4111.7 4633.8 4869.8
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Main socioeconomic indicators of Zavkhan aimag 
          
  Measurement unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 95.9 95.8 95 93.7 90 87.2 86.8 84.6
Number of herder households Number 12164 12304 13468 13284 13305 12825 11081 10121
Number of poor population Person 16916 22318 26210 42673         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2120 32625 4159 3843 3200 2829 2916 1830
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 45 39 37 33 39 30 30 39
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2401.4 2474.5 2556.5 2603.6 2432 1941.3 1486.7 1443.2
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 985.3 1170.7 710.3 1094.8 724.3 705.7 366.5 613.8
Local budget income Million MNT 506.8 565.4 614.7 723 794.1 771 1347.2 2077.6
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 2002.6 2433.3 3143.6 3160.3 3840 4720.2 5559.4 5849.7
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